STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
                          SUPREME COURT
ESTATE OF PAUL K. SHERMAN                    :
v.                            :    Appeal No. 98 - 0157


                                   Robert Senville #4289
                                        PO Box 4944
                                        Rumford, RI 02916

Date:  April 16, 1999
                        TABLE OF CONTENTS
A.   A judge who, in his official capacity, violates Article 1, Section 5 of the Rhode
          Island Constitution by selling a judicial opinion should be liable to the injured party
          in a civil action for damages 9
1.   Selling a judicial opinion violates Article 1, Section 5 of the Constitution    9
2.   A lawsuit for damages may be brought under Article 1,
          Section 5 of the Constitution because Article 1, Section 5 is
          self-executing 13
     a.   The First Criterion
     i.   The  right to justice without purchase is described
               in detail     15
     ii.  A person denied his right to justice without
               purchase ought to have a remedy   16
     b.   The Second Criterion - The General Assembly has
               no express mandate to implement the right to justice
               without purchase   17
     c.   The Third Criterion - As in Bivens the legislative history
               is silent on the issue of private right of action    17
     d.   The Fourth Criterion     19
          i.  Sherman has no other meaningful remedy        19
     ii.  Judicial immunity peserves judicial
               independence,  and judicial independence must be 
               guarded jealously 27
     iii. When it is possible in practice to confine the
               abrogation of judicial immunity to a complaint
               against a judge who was actually guilty of bribery,
               it is monstrous to deny recovery  30
                      TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
     Decisions of this Court
Amaral v. Cabral, 494 A.2d 94 (R.I. 1985)    8
Bandoni v. State, 715 A.2d 580 (R.I. 1998)   passim
Bragg v. Warwick Shoppers World, Inc., 102 R.I. 8, 227 A.2d 582(R.I. 1967)    8
Brough v. Foley, 572 A.2d 63 (R.I. 1990)     8
Calhoun v. City of Providence, 390 A.2d 350 (R.I. 1978)     28
Conley v. Woonsocket Inst. for Sav., 11 R.I. 147 (1874)     12
City of Warwick v. Aptt, 497 A.2d 721 (R.I.1985)  8
Estate of Sherman v. Almeida  610 A.2d 104 (R.I. 1992) 22
Fournier v. Miriam Hospital, 175 A.2d 298 (R.I. 1961)  31
Gagnon v. State, 570 A.2d 656 (R.I. 1990)    8
Hudson v. Geary, 4 R.I. 485 (1857) 12
In re Paul K. Sherman, 565 A.2d 870 (R.I. 1989)   3, 6, 37
Jones v. Aciz, 109 R.I. 612, 289 A.2d 44 (R.I. 1972)   12
Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Clarke, 41 R.I. 350, 103 A. 935 (R.I. 1918)  12
Kennedy v. Cumberland Engineering Co., Inc., 471 A.2d 195 (R.I. 1984) 12, 19, 30
Lemoine v. Martineau, 342 A.2d 616 (R.I. 1975)    12, 30
Lewis v. Smith, 21 R.I. 324, 43 A. 542 (R.I. 1899)     12
Littlefield v. Peckham, 1 R.I. 500 (1851)    12
Matter of Almeida, 611 A.2d 1375 (R.I. 1992) 21, 22, 25
Mesolella v. City of Providence, 508 A.2d 661 (R.I. 1986)   8
Nagy v. McBurney, 120 R.I. 925, 392 A.2d 365 (R.I. 1978)    33
Narragansett Elec. Lighting Co. v. Sabre, 50 R.I. 288, 146 A.777, 66 A.L.R. 1553 (1929) 12
Perce v. Hallett, 13 R.I. 365 (1881)    11, 12, 15
Rhode Island Affiliate, ACLU v. Bernasconi, 557 A.2d 1232 (R.I.1989)     8
Salvadore v. Major Elec. & Supply, Inc., 469 A. 353 (R.I. 1983) 8
Soares v. Ann & Hope of Rhode Island, Inc., 637 A.2d 339 (R.I.1994) 33
Solitro v. Moffatt, 523 A.2d 858 (R.I.1987)  33
Spalding v. Bainbridge, 12 R.I. 244 (1878)   12
Thompson v. Thompson, 495 A.2d 678 (R.I. 1988)    8
Vigue v. John E. Fogarty Memorial Hosp., 481 A.2d 1 (R.I. 1984) 8
     Provisions of the Rhode Island Constitution
Article 1, Section 5     passim
Article 1, Section 23    16, 17
     Rhode Island General Laws
R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-16-1 et. seq.   27
R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-16-7(b)    27
R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-7-3  5
R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-7-5  5
R.I. Gen. Laws §12-25-4  26
     Rhode Island Rules and Regulations
R.I. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)     7, 8
     United States Supreme Court Decisions
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)passim
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 646 (1872)   22, 29
Davis v. Burke, 179 U.S. 399 (1900)     14
Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980)    27
Forrester v. White,  484 U.S. 219 (1988)     27
Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933)  14
J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964)  13
          Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944) 22
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803) 14, 17
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991) 27
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967)     27, 28, 29
Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984)   25
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978)  27, 28
     Other Court Decisions
Brown v. State, 89 N.Y.2d 172, 652 N.Y.S.2d 223, 674 N.E.2d 1129,1138 (N.Y. 1996)19
Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Fox Theatre Corp., 182 F. Supp. 18(1960) 22
Cok v. Constentino, 876 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989)    28
Convention Center Referendum Committee v. Board of Elections and
Ethics, 399 A.2d 550 (D.C. Ct. App.1979)     15
Dawkins v. Lord Paulet, LR 5 QB 94, 110, cited in,  Pierson v.
Ray, 386 U.S. at 566(1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting)   29
Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Hall, 270 S.E.2d 617 (N.C. 1980)21
Figueroa v. State, 61 Haw. 369, 604 P.2d 1198 (Haw. 1979)   19
Garcia v. Hilton Hotels International, Inc., 97 F.Supp. 5 (D.C.1951) 8
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2nd Cir.1949)   32
Hurley v. Fuyat, WL 930891 (R.I.Super. 1994) 25, 28
In re Benoit, 487 A.2d 1158 (Me. 1988)  21
Johnson v. Johnson, 424 P.2d 414 (Okl. 1967) 22
Kintz v. Harriger, 99 Ohio St. 240, 124 N.E. 168, 12 A.L.R. 1240 (1919) 31-37
Lewis v. Lewis, 351 N.E.2d 526 (Mass. 1976)  31
Mayle v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Hwys., 479 Pa.. 384, 388 A.2d 709 (Pa. 1978) 31
Root Refining Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 169 F.2d 514 (1948) 22
Sax v. Vottelier, 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983) 31
Shields v. Gerhart, 658 A.2d 924 (Vt. 1995)  14, 15, 18, 19
Skelly Oil Company v. Universal Oil Products Company, 338 Ill.
App. 79, 86 N.E. 2d 875 (Ill.1949) 20, 21
Spaids v. Barrett, 57 Ill. 289 (1870)   22
Taffe v. Downes, Chief Justice of the King's Bench (Court of
Common Pleas of Ireland 1813), reported in, Calder v. Halket, 13
Eng. Rep. 12 at 18 n.(a) (P.C. 1839)    37
United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 349 F. Supp. 22(1972) 22
          Wilkin v. Sunbeam Corp., 466 F.2d 714 (1972) 22
     Provisions of U.S. Constitution and Statutes
Amend 4   13, 14, 15, 16
Amend 5   16
Amend 8   16
Amend 9   11
     Provisions of Other Constitutions of Western Civilization
Mag. Char. Joh. chapt. 40 (1215)   9, 11
Mag. Char. Hen.3, chapt. 29 (1225) 9, 11
     Provisions of Other State Constitutions
Alabama Const. Art 1, § 13    9
Arkansas Const. Art. 2, § 13  9
Colorado Const. Art. 2, § 6   9
Connecticut Const. Art. 1, § 10    10
Delaware Const. Art. 1, § 9   10
Idaho Const. Art. 1, § 18     10
Illinois Const. Art. 1, § 12  10
Illinois Const. (1870) Art. II, § 19    20
Indiana Const. Art. 1, § 12   10
Kansas Const., Bill of Rights, § 18     10
Kentucky Const., Bill of Rights, § 14   10
Louisiana Const. Art. 1, § 22 10
Maine Const. Art. 1, § 19     10
Maryland Const., Declaration of Rights, § 19 10
Massachusetts Const., Declaration of Rights, § 11 10
Minnesota Const. Art. 1, § 8  10
Mississippi Const. Art. 3, § 24    10
Missouri Const. Art. 1, § 14  10
Montana Const. Art. 2, § 16   10
Nebraska Const. Art. 1, § 13  10
New Hampshire Const. Art. 1, § 14  10
North Carolina Const. Art. 1, § 18 10, 21
Ohio Const. Art. 1, § 16 10, 34
Oklahoma Const. Art. 2, § 6   10
Oregon Const. Art. 1, § 10    10
Pennsylvania Const. Art. 1, § 11   10
South Dakota Const. Art. 6, § 20   10
Tennessee Const. Art. 1, § 17 10
Texas Const. Art. 1 § 17 10
Utah Const. Art. 1, § 11 10
Vermont Const. Art. 1, § 4    10
West Virginia Const. Art. 3, § 17  10
Wisconsin Const. Art. 1, § 9  10
Wyoming Const. Art. 1, § 8    10
     Books and Texts
Eliot, J. (ed .), Debates in the Several State Conventions on the
     Adoption of the Federal Constitution, Volume 1, 1 Eliot's
     Debates 334-37 (1836)    10
Friesen, Jennifer, State Constitutional Law:  Litigating
     Individual Rights, Claims, and Defenses, § 7.05[1], at 7-14
     (1995)    19
Ruffhead, Owen (ed.), Statutes-at-Large, Vol.I (Magna Charta -
End Henry 6)   9
     Articles from Law Reviews and Scholarly Journals
Joseph R. Weisberger, The Twilight of Judicial Independence -
     Pulliam v. Allen, 19 Suffolk U. L. REV. 537 (1985)     26,
     29, 30
     Miscellaneous Materials
          Jane Munson, guardian of the person of Paul K. Sherman,  v. Thomas C. Hutton, No. 91-7880 (Providence
     County Superior Court)   24
Woody Guthrie, Lyric of “Pretty Boy Floyd,” at    30
     This case arose because a former Justice of the Superior
Court of the State of Rhode Island issued a corrupt decision and
received his payment by exacting money from the proceeds a jury
awarded a severely disabled man.  The appellant is the estate of
this disabled man and it claims the right to sue the former
Superior Court Justice because this man’s right to justice
without purchase has been violated.  The Superior Court dismissed
the claim on the ground of judicial immunity.  Appellant has
appealed because this case does not threaten the independence of
Rhode Island judges, and because denying recovery in this
situation is monstrous.
      Appellant,  Estate of Paul K. Sherman,  is  a  guardianship
estate. Appellee, Antonio S. Almeida, is a former Justice of  the
Rhode  Island  Superior Court.  Paul K. Sherman  (“Sherman”)  has
been  in  a persistent vegetative state since September 12,  1981
when   he   unsuccessfully  attempted  suicide   at   the   Adult
Correctional  Institution.   In  July,  1983  Paul   K.   Sherman
(“Sherman”)  sued  the  State  of Rhode  Island  for  negligence,
claiming  that breaches of duty of care by correctional  officers
caused  his injuries.   On March 13, 1987 a jury awarded  Sherman
One   Million  Seven  Thousand  Dollars  ($1,007,000.00).     The
purpose of the jury award was to pay Sherman’s medical bills,  to
pay  for  necessary medical care, and to pay for durable  medical
equipment that would alleviate Sherman’s pain and suffering.   On
April  22,  1987  the Superior Court Justice  who  conducted  the
trial, Justice Calderone, denied Sherman’s motion for prejudgment
interest.    On June 11, 1987 a private law,  1987  R.I.  Acts  &
Resolves  187,   was  introduced to require the  State  of  Rhode
Island to pay  Sherman pre and post judgment interest on the jury
verdict.    This private law was approved by the General Assembly
on July 11, 1987.    On October 26, 1987,  Mr. Justice Antonio S.
Almeida  (“Almeida”)  was assigned to hear  a  post-trial  motion
which  would determine the gross amount of the proceeds, the  net
amount  of  the  proceeds,  and which  would  apportion  the  net
proceeds  between  Sherman and his attorney,  Thomas  C.  Hutton.
Judge  Almeida  and Thomas C. Hutton, who was Sherman’s  attorney
and his probate co-guardian, entered a corrupt agreement that  in
return  for  money  the Judge would issue a decision  that  would
reverse  Justice Calderone’s decision on post-judgment  interest,
and  award  prejudgment  interest and thereby  add  approximately
$600,000.00  to  the  jury  award.   Judge  Almeida  would   then
corruptly  apportion the award the $1,600,000  in  the  following
manner:  litigation costs and 45% of the net proceeds  would   be
paid  to  Attorney Hutton, and 55% of the net proceeds  would  be
paid  to  the  Estate of Paul K. Sherman.  On November  16,  1987
Judge  Almeida  issued his corrupt decision, and  authorized  the
partial   disbursements  to  Attorney  Hutton.    Judge   Almeida
received  his  payment from Attorney Hutton for the  issuance  of
this corrupt decision from the money the jury awarded Sherman  in
three  instalments, and the amount he received was $18,000,  more
or less.
      On  October  5,  1987  Judge Almeida authorized  a  partial
disbursement of $10,000.00 to Sherman and $40,000.00 to  attorney
Hutton.   On  January  12, 1988, pending a ruling  by  the  Rhode
Island  Supreme Court to review Judge Almeida’s apportionment  of
the  jury verdict, net proceeds in the amount of $227,987.31 were
awarded  to  Attorney Hutton, along with checks of  $9,260.04  to
Attorney  Hutton,  and  $14,246.89 to Attorney  Hutton,  and  net
proceeds  in the amount of. $143,070.16 were awarded to  Sherman.
Beginning on February 28, 1988 Attorneys Hutton and Hickey  began
to  embezzle  funds from the $143,070.16 that had  been  awarded,
under this corrupt decision, to Sherman’s probate estate.
      On  November 9, 1989, in reviewing the apportionment of the
jury  award  between  Sherman and Attorney Hutton  authorized  by
Justice  Almeida,  Ms. Justice Murray, without knowledge  of  the
corrupt arrangement between Attorney Hutton and Judge Almeida and
without  knowledge  of  Attorney Hutton’s and  Attorney  Hickey’s
embezzlement of Sherman’s probate estate funds, writing  for  the
Court, made the following prophetic and compassionate statement:
     We  find this conclusion (that the attorney is entitled
     to  an amount equivalent to 76% of the net verdict)  to
     be  unreasonable  as a matter of law.   If  plaintiff’s
     theory  were  carried  to its logical  conclusion,  the
     attorney’s  fee  agreement  could  exceed  the   actual
     recovery  ... In considering the figures in this  case,
     we  believe  that  the current arrangement  jeopardizes
     Paul’s future.  The 1985 private act, the jury verdict,
     and the lawsuit itself were all intended to benefit the
     incompetent  Paul.   We  fail to  see  how  Paul  could
     benefit   from  an  arrangement  wherein  the  attorney
     collects  more than the individual whose  interest  and
     future  the  attorney  is hired to  protect.  (Emphasis
In  re Paul K. Sherman, 565 A.2d 870, 873 (R.I. 1989). On May  9,
1990,  pursuant to the decision of the Rhode Island Supreme Court
in  In  re  Paul K. Sherman, an additional One Hundred Fifty  One
Thousand  and  Six  Hundred Fifty Five Dollars ($151,655.00)  was
paid  by  the  State  of  Rhode Island to Sherman’s  guardianship
estate.  On May 24, 1990 Attorney Hutton began to embezzle  money
from this $151,655 award to Sherman.
      Within a year of this $151,655 payment to Sherman’s probate
estate  the nursing home in Johnston, Rhode Island where  Sherman
resided,  the Morgan Health Care Center, wanted to evict  Sherman
because  his  bills  were  not being paid.   Sherman   was  in  a
persistent  vegetative  state  and required  specialized  medical
equipment and services.   The attorney who was handling Sherman’s
affairs,  Thomas C. Hutton, informed the nursing home that  there
were no funds to pay for Sherman’s care.
       The   Rhode   Island   Protection  and   Advocacy   System
(“RIPAS”)(now  the  Rhode Island Disability Law  Center),  a  law
office  that  receives federal and state funds  to  advocate  the
rights of individuals with severe disabilities, on referral  from
the  Morgan Health Care Center, petitioned the Providence Probate
Court to cite Attorney Hutton and Hope Sherman, Sherman’s mother,
who  were  co-guardians  of the estate, to  file  an  accounting.
Attorney Hutton refused to produce an accounting and resigned his
guardianship. As Hutton had custody of all the financial  records
of the estate, Hope Sherman was directed to obtain and did obtain
from  Fleet  Bank microfiche copies of the checks that  had  been
drawn   on  Sherman’s  estate.   The  microfiche  checks   showed
embezzlement  by  Hutton and his associate  Hickey  of  over  One
Hundred Thousand Dollars ($112,000.00) of Sherman’s money.
      Hutton and Hickey’s embezzlement of Sherman’s estate  funds
was  reported  to the Attorney General’s office.  As  Hutton  and
Hickey  were  attorneys, Chief Disciplinary Counsel  (now  United
States District Court Judge) Lisi began her investigation.
     On July 17, 1991 Chief Disciplinary Counsel filed a petition
for  the  interim suspension of Attorney Hutton from the practice
of  law.  She also filed a petition for the suspension of  Hickey
from  the  practice of law.  Attorney Hutton was  interviewed  by
Disciplinary  Counsel and by the Attorney General’s Office,  and,
facing  disciplinary  proceedings and  criminal  charges,  Hutton
alleged  that he and Judge Almeida had a corrupt relationship  in
the  Sherman case as well as in other cases in which  Hutton  had
been appointed by Judge Almeida as a receiver.
      As  part of a deal between Attorney Hutton and the Attorney
General, and at the direction of the Attorney General, on Sunday,
July  21,  1991 Attorney Hutton wore a wiretap and, through  pre-
arrangement, met with Judge Almeida for breakfast at “Everybody’s
Favorite  Restaurant” in Cumberland, Rhode Island. Prior  to  the
meeting  Attorney  Hutton was given a sealed envelope  containing
fifteen one hundred dollar bills.  Prior to sealing the envelope,
the  Attorney  General’s Office recorded the serial  numbers  and
treated  the bills with materials which would leave a  detectable
residue  if  the  treated bills were handled.  At  the  breakfast
meeting   Judge Almeida’s conversation with Attorney  Hutton  was
electronically  monitored and recorded.  At  the  time  of  Judge
Almeida’s  arrest shortly after this meeting, Judge  Almeida  had
the $1,500 in treated money that Attorney Hutton had given him at
the  breakfast  meeting   in his pants pocket.   Judge  Almeida’s
conversation  with Attorney Hutton regarding the purpose  of  the
receipt  of  this  money  was  audio  taped.  Upon  leaving   the
restaurant, Judge Almeida was arrested, and on the same day Judge
Almeida  was arraigned at an unusual Sunday afternoon session  of
the Superior Court.
      The  next  day, July 22, 1991 Attorney Hutton was suspended
from  the  practice of law by Order of the Rhode  Island  Supreme
Court.   Attorney Hickey was also suspended from the practice  of
      On  July  23,  1991  the  Probate  Court  of  the  City  of
Providence,  Sciarretta,  Probate  Judge,   found  that  Attorney
Hutton  had breached his fiduciary duties to Paul K. Sherman  and
Hutton was removed as Sherman’s guardian.
      On  August  2, 1991, the Commission on Judicial Tenure  and
Discipline  prepared  and submitted to the Rhode  Island  Supreme
Court   its  preliminary  investigation  report  regarding  Judge
Almeida.  In December, 1991 the Commission on Judicial Tenure and
Discipline   found  as  fact that Judge Almeida  had  engaged  in
dishonorable  service, including the receipt of a  bribe  in  the
Paul  K. Sherman case, and  issued its recommendation that  Judge
Almeida  be removed from office and that his pension payments  be
terminated retroactive to the date of his retirement.
      On  November 18, 1991 the Statewide Grand Jury of the State
of Rhode Island, issued an eight count indictment against Antonio
S. Almeida.  Count One charged that:
           ANTONIO  S. ALMEIDA, of Providence County,  while
     employed  by  the  State of Rhode Island  as  a  public
     official  in the capacity of Associate Justice  of  the
     Superior Court of the State of Rhode Island, on diverse
     days and dates between and including March 13, 1988 and
     November 10, 1988, the exact days and dates unknown  to
     the  grand jurors, at Providence, in Providence  County
     and  elsewhere, did corruptly obtain for  himself  from
     Thomas  C. Hutton ... valuable consideration,  to  wit,
     United States currency totaling $18,000, more or  less,
     as  a reward for having done an act in relation to  the
     business  of the State of Rhode Island, to wit,  ruling
     on  matters in the case of  Paul K. Sherman v. State of
     Rhode  Island,  C.A. 83-2729 (P.M.  83-2092,  C.A.  87-
     2264),  and for showing favor to Thomas Hutton  and  to
     the  party1   represented by Thomas C.  Hutton  in  the
     Sherman  case, in violation of §§11-7-32 and 11-7-5  of
     the  General  Laws  of Rhode Island, 1956,  as  amended
     (Reenactment of 1981).[Appendix Exhibit 2].
      On  February  27,  1992 Sherman filed  this  civil  lawsuit
against Judge Almeida.  Count 3  alleges that Justice Almeida, in
his  official capacity as a Justice of the Superior Court of  the
State  of  Rhode Island, sold a judicial opinion in violation  of
Article  1, Section 5 of the Rhode Island Constitution.  Count  3
of  Sherman’s civil action seeks restitution and punitive damages
against Almeida in his official capacity.
      On April 6, 1992, the Rhode Island Supreme Court issued  an
order   accepting  the  findings  and  recommendations   of   the
Commission  terminating petitioner's pension rights and  benefits
as of that date, with an opinion to follow.
      On  May  7,  1992 Attorney Hutton pled nolo  contendere  to
charges  that he had embezzled money from the Estate of  Paul  K.
Sherman, and was sentenced to prison.
      On  May  18, 1992 Almeida appeared with his counsel  before
Justice  Darigan and pled  guilty  to the eight counts as charged
in  the  indictment  and  the Court having  asked  the  defendant
whether  he  had  anything  to say why  judgment  should  not  be
pronounced,  and no sufficient cause to the contrary having  been
shown or appearing to the Court, it was ADJUDGED that Antonio  S.
Almeida  was guilty as charged and Almeida was convicted. Almeida
was sentenced to prison. [Appendix Exhibit 3].
      On November 26, 1997 the Superior Court, Justice Judith  C.
Savage  presiding,  granted Judge Almeida’s  12(b)(6)  motion  to
dismiss.  The Superior Court summarily dismissed Sherman’s  claim
on  the  ground  that Article 1, Section 5 of  the  Rhode  Island
Constitution  does  not by its terms create a  private  right  of
action by a litigant against a judge in his official capacity who
allegedly  sells justice nor does it provide for a civil  damages
remedy in that instance. [Appendix Exhibit 1]. Sherman appeals to
this  Court because he contends that the decision of the Superior
Court  misconstrues the fundamental purpose and operative  effect
of  Article  1, Section 5 of the Rhode Island Constitution.  III.
      A  judge who, in his official capacity, violates Article 1,
Section  5 of the Rhode Island Constitution by selling a judicial
opinion  should be liable to the injured party in a civil  action
for  damages.  A judge who is in fact guilty of using his  powers
for  a  personal motive not connected with the public good should
not escape liability for injuries he so caused. Requiring that  a
plaintiff prove that the judge sued has been convicted of bribery
and  removed from office for soliciting or accepting bribes  will
confine  the  abrogation  of  judicial  immunity  to  judges  who
actually sell justice.  To deny a disabled man a remedy against a
judge  who corruptly took a  portion of the money a jury  awarded
for  the  purpose  of providing medical care and durable  medical
equipment  that would  alleviate the pain and suffering  of  this
man  is monstrous, and should not be countenanced by this Supreme
Ironically,  the  Superior  Court’s  ruling  also  threatens  the
independence of the judiciary, (the very value which the Superior
Court  says  it  is  seeking to preserve), by undermining  public
confidence in the integrity of the judiciary.
     The standard of review on appeal from a trial court granting
a  12(b)(6)  motion for failure to state a claim is to  test  the
sufficiency  of  the complaint by assuming that all  the  factual
allegations are true and by resolving any legal doubts  in  favor
of  the  plaintiff.  Rhode Island Affiliate, ACLU v.  Bernasconi,
557 A.2d 1232, 1232 (R.I.1989);  Bragg v. Warwick Shoppers World,
Inc.,  102  R.I. 8, 227 A.2d 582 (1967) quoting Garcia v.  Hilton
Hotels  International, Inc., D.C., 97 F.Supp. 5,  8.   See  also,
Brough  v.  Foley, 572 A.2d 63 (R.I. 1990); Gagnon v. State,  570
A.2d  656, 657 (R.I. 1990);  Thompson v. Thompson, 495  A.2d  678
(R.I.  1988); Mesolella v. City of Providence, 508 A.2d 661 (R.I.
1986);  Amaral v. Cabral, 494 A.2d 94 (R.I. 1985); Vigue v.  John
E.  Fogarty Memorial Hosp., 481 A.2d 1 (R.I. 1984); Salvadore  v.
Major  Elec. & Supply, Inc., 469 A. 353 (R.I. 1983).   Generally,
dismissal of a civil complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper only
if  it  "appears beyond a reasonable doubt that a plaintiff would
not  be  entitled to relief under any conceivable set of  facts."
Id., 557 A.2d at 1232 (quoting, City of Warwick v. Aptt, 497 A.2d
721,  723 (R.I.1985).  In Count 3 of Sherman’s complaint  it  was
alleged  that Almeida’s receipt of money from Sherman’s  judgment
proceeds  for  the issuance of a judicial opinion was  a  corrupt
sale  of justice.  The issuance of this decision was also alleged
to  be an act performed within Almeida’s official capacity  as  a
Superior  Court Justice, and it was further alleged that Almeida,
in his official capacity, had jurisdiction over the post-judgment
motion he corruptly decided.
A.   A  judge who, in his official capacity, violates Article  1,
     Section  5  of  the Rhode Island Constitution by  selling  a
     judicial opinion should be liable to the injured party in  a
     civil action for damages.
     1.   Selling  a judicial opinion violates Article 1, Section
          5 of the Constitution.
      The  second sentence of Article 1, Section 5 of  the  Rhode
Island Constitution provides a right to justice:
       Right  to  justice ... Every person ought  to  obtain
     right   and   justice  freely,  and  without  purchase,
     completely  and  without denial; promptly  and  without
     delay; conformably to the laws.
Every Rhode Island judge who has construed the “right to justice”
provision   of   Article  1,  Section  5  of  the  Rhode   Island
Constitution  has agreed that, at a minimum, it guarantees  every
person  in  this  state  a right to obtain  justice  freely,  and
without purchase.
      The  right to justice established in Article 1,  Section  5
derives   from    Magna  Charta.   In  1215   A.D.   civilization
established its first constitutional form of government.  In  the
Great  Charter   a  fundamental legal principle was  established:
"nulli  vendemus,  nulli negabimus,  aut  differemus  rectum  aut
justiciam3,”  there  shall  be right and  justice  without  sale,
denial  or delay.  Mag. Char. Joh. chapt. 40 (1215);  Mag.  Char.
Hen.3, chapt. 29 (1225).
      This  principle is widely incorporated into the declaration
of  rights provisions of state constitutions.  Alabama Const. Art
1,  § 13;  Arkansas Const. Art. 2, § 13;  Colorado Const. Art. 2,
§  6; Connecticut Const. Art. 1, § 10;  Delaware Const. Art. 1, §
9;  Idaho  Const. Art. 1, § 18;  Illinois Const. Art.  1,  §  12;
Indiana  Const. Art. 1, § 12;  Kansas Const., Bill of  Rights,  §
18;   Kentucky  Const., Bill of Rights, § 14;   Louisiana  Const.
Art.  1,  §  22;   Maine Const. Art. 1, § 19;   Maryland  Const.,
Declaration  of Rights, § 19;  Massachusetts Const.,  Declaration
of  Rights,  §  11;  Minnesota Const. Art. 1, §  8;   Mississippi
Const.  Art.  3, § 24;  Missouri Const. Art. 1,  §  14;   Montana
Const.  Art.  2,  §  16;  Nebraska Const.  Art.  1,  §  13;   New
Hampshire  Const. Art. 1, § 14; North Carolina Const. Art.  1,  §
18;   Ohio  Const. Art. 1, § 16;  Oklahoma Const. Art.  2,  §  6;
Oregon  Const. Art. 1, § 10; Pennsylvania Const. Art.  1,  §  11;
South Dakota Const. Art. 6, § 20;  Tennessee Const. Art. 1, § 17;
Texas  Const.  Art. 1 § 17;  Utah Const. Art. 1, §  11;   Vermont
Const.  Art.  1,  §  4;   West Virginia  Const.  Art.  3,  §  17;
Wisconsin Const. Art. 1, § 9;  Wyoming Const. Art. 1, § 8.
      The  right  to justice in Rhode Island precedes  the  Rhode
Island Constitution, and precedes Rhode Island’s ratification  of
the  United  States Constitution.   In Rhode Island's Convention,
held  between May 24, 1790 and May 29, 1790, ratifying the United
States Constitution, the Convention declared certain rights  that
could   not   be  "abridged  or  violated"  and  declared   their
"impression"   that  said  rights  were  "consistent   with   the
Constitution."  Among the rights declared at this Convention  was
the following:
     "That  every freeman ought to obtain right and justice,
     freely and without sale, completely and without denial,
     promptly and without delay; and that all establishments
     or regulations contravening these rights are oppressive
     and unjust."
1   Eliot's   Debates  334-37,  Debates  in  the  Several   State
Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (J. Eliot
ed. 1836), Volume 1 at 334-37.  Therefore, as early as 1790 Rhode
Island  had  declared  that every freeman enjoyed  the  right  to
justice  without sale, and that all laws contravening this  right
were  oppressive  and unjust.  Rhode Islanders conditioned  their
ratification  of the United States Constitution on,  inter  alia,
this  understanding. As such, the right to justice  without  sale
appears  to  be one of the "other rights" retained by the  people
and  is  affirmatively protected by the Ninth  Amendment  to  the
United  States  Constitution.  If so, the federal  government  is
without power to contravene this right.
      A thorough explanation of the second sentence of Article 1,
Section  5 of the Rhode Island Constitution is found in Perce  v.
Hallett,  13 R.I. 365 (1881). In that case Durfee, C.J. upheld  a
dismissal of an action for nonpayment of the entry fee prescribed
by  statute. Chief Justice Durfee described the purpose  of  this
provision in chapter 40 of the Magna Charta:
     "The better opinion is that it was designed to abolish,
     not  fixed fees, prescribed for the purpose of revenue,
     but  fines  which were anciently paid  to  expedite  or
     delay law proceedings and procure favor. See Thompson's
     Essay  on  the  Magna Charta, p.230.  The character  of
     those  fines is copiously exemplified by Madox  in  the
     twelfth chapter of his History of the Exchequer.   They
     appear   to   have  been  arbitrary  exactions,   often
     outrageously oppressive.  Madox concludes  his  twelfth
     chapter with the following language: 'Some men used  to
     pay  fines to have to obtain justice or right;  others,
     to  have  their  right  or their legal  proceedings  or
     judgment speeded; others, for stopping or delaying  the
     proceedings  at  law; and others were  obliged  to  pay
     great and excessive fines (viz., a fourth part, a third
     part,  or half of the debt sued for) to obtain  justice
     and  right, according to their several cases,  so  that
     the  king seemed to sell justice and right to some  and
     delay or deny it to others.  Against these mischiefs  a
     remedy  was provided by a clause in the great  charters
     of  liberties,  made by King John and King  Henry  III.
     That  clause in each of those charters runs in the same
     or  consonant  words, which are these: Nulli  vendemus,
     nulli  negabimus, aut differemus rectum aut justiciam.'
     Mag. Char. Joh. 40; Char. Hen. III. 33 (sic.)"
Perce  v. Hallett, supra, 13 R.I. at 365.   After  reviewing  the
historical  purpose of this provision, Perce analyzed legislative
practice and held: "[W]e think the legitimate conclusion is, that
the  declaration of the Constitution was intended to prohibit ...
gratuities,  or  exactions,  given or  demanded  for  the  direct
purpose of influencing the course of legal proceedings."  Id.  at
     Perce is the law.  For over a century since its issuance the
Rhode  Island Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the  purpose
of  the  second  sentence of Article 1, Section 5  of  the  Rhode
Island Constitution is to prohibit gratuities or exactions  given
or  demanded for the direct purpose of influencing the course  of
legal  proceedings.  It has been so held in cases  regarding  the
right   of   poor   litigants  to  proceed  in  forma   pauperis.
Littlefield  v. Peckham, 1 R.I. 500 (1851); Hudson  v.  Geary,  4
R.I.  485 (1857);  Conley v. Woonsocket Inst. for Sav.,  11  R.I.
147 (1874) ("To require security for costs is not a purchasing of
justice");  Spalding v. Bainbridge, 12 R.I. 244 (1878);  Perce v.
Hallett,  41  R.I.  at  365  (1881)("[T]he  declaration  of   the
Constitution   was   intended  to  prohibit...   gratuities,   or
exactions,   given  or  demanded  for  the  direct   purpose   of
influencing the course of legal proceedings."); Lewis  v.  Smith,
21  R.I.  324, 43 A. 542 (1899);  Joslin Mfg. Co. v.  Clarke,  41
R.I.  350,  103  A. 935 (1918) ("...this section is  intended  to
prohibit  the exactions of money from litigants for the  granting
of  justice");  Narragansett Elec. Lighting Co. v. Sabre, 50 R.I.
288,  146 A. 777, 66 A.L.R. 1553 (1929);  Jones v. Aciz, 109 R.I.
612,  289  A.2d  44 (1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S.  1094,  93
S.Ct.  704, 34 L.Ed.2d 678 (1972).  It has been so held  in cases
in  which  other  purposes for Article 1,  Section  5  have  been
discerned.  Lemoine v. Martineau, 342 A.2d 616 (1975) (“[O]ne  of
the purposes of this constitutional mandate [R.I. Const. art I, §
5]  was  to  prevent  the sovereign from selling  justice  ...”);
Kennedy v. Cumberland Engineering Co., Inc., 471 A.2d 195  (1984)
(Murray,  J.  dissenting)   ("Historically,  art.  I,   sec   5's
'purchase' clause was borrowed directly from the Magna Charta and
'was  designed  to  abolish, not fixed fees, prescribed  for  the
purposes of revenue, but the fines which were anciently  paid  to
expedite  or  delay law proceedings and procure favor'  Perce  v.
Hallett,  13  R.I.  363, 364 (1881).  In this  sense,  'the  king
seemed to sell justice and right to some and to delay or deny  it
to others.'”).
      While  the Superior Court acknowledges that the purpose  of
the  second  sentence of Article 1, Section 5 is to prohibit  the
sale  of  right and justice, the Court fails to find that  former
Justice  Almeida   violated Sherman’s right  to  justice  without
purchase  under  Article 1, Section 5.  Rather, the  Court  below
ruled  that  whatever  the facts may be  this  provision  of  the
Constitution may  not be enforced by a civil action  for  damages
by  a  litigant  against a judge.  Appellant disagrees  with  the
Superior  Court’s  refusal  to  acknowledge  that  former   Judge
Almeida’s  conduct  violated  Article  1,  Section   5   of   the
Constitution.  Because the Superior Court never acknowledged that
the   constitution   was   violated,  it  never    balanced   the
plaintiff’s  claim  to  justice  without  purchase  against   the
defendant’s claim of judicial immunity.
2.         A  lawsuit for damages may be brought under Article 1,
     Section 5 of the Constitution because Article 1, Section 5 is
      The Superior Court decision holds that: "Article 1, Section
5  does  not by its terms create a private right of action  by  a
litigant  against a judge in his official capacity who  allegedly
sells  justice nor does it provide for a civil damages remedy  in
that  instance."   (Decision pp. 12-13).  Appellant  respectfully
       First,  Article  1, Section 5's right to  justice  without
purchase is enforceable by a civil action for damages.  It is law
that  even  without  a statute authorizing  a  private  right  of
action,  a  private right of action may arise directly from  acts
violating  a fundamental right secured by a constitution.  Bivens
v.  Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,  403
U.S.  388, 29 L.Ed.2d 619, 91 S.Ct.1999 (1971).  Bivens held that
a  violation  of  the Fourth Amendment by federal  agents  acting
under  color of their authority gave rise to a private  right  of
action for money damages:
     "The  question is merely whether petitioner, if he  can
     demonstrate an injury consequent upon the violation  by
     federal  agents  of  his Fourth  Amendment  rights,  is
     entitled  to  redress his injury through  a  particular
     remedial  mechanism normally available in  the  federal
     courts.  Cf. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426,  433
     (1964);  Jacobs  v.  United States,  290  U.S.  13,  16
     (1933).   'The very essence of civil liberty  certainly
     consists in the right of every individual to claim  the
     protection of the laws whenever he receives an injury.'
     Marbury  v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803).   Having
     concluded that petitioner's complaint states a cause of
     action  under  the  Fourth  Amendment,  we  hold   that
     petitioner is entitled to recover money damages for any
     injuries  he  has suffered as a result of  the  agents'
     violation of the Amendment."
403  U.S. at 397.4  According to the United State Supreme  Court,
from  Chief  Justice Marshal in 1803 through Bivens, in  1971  to
deny  an individual a remedy consequent upon a violation  of  his
constitutional rights would be to deny that individual "the  very
essence of civil liberty." 403 U.S. at 397.
      However, before permitting a private right of action  under
the  Rhode Island Constitution, this Court has recently held that
it  must first be determined whether the Constitutional provision
is  self-executing.   Bandoni v. State, 715 A.2d 580 (R.I. 1998).
In  Bandoni  this  Court adopted the standard enunciated  by  the
United States Supreme Court in Davis v. Burke, 179 U.S. 399, 403,
21   S.Ct.  210,  212,  45  L.Ed.  249,  251  (1900):  does   the
constitutional provision supply “a sufficient rule  by  means  of
which  the right given may be enjoyed and protected, or the  duty
imposed enforced * * * [or does] it merely indicate[] principles,
without laying down rules by which those principles may be  given
the  force  of  law.” Bandoni v. State, 715 A.2d at  587   citing
Davis,  179 U.S. 399, 403, 21 S.Ct. 210, 212, 45 L.Ed.  249,  251
(1900).   Bandoni further held that the standards  enunciated  by
the  Vermont Supreme Court in Shields v. Gerhart, 658  A.2d  924,
928   were   helpful  as  guidelines  in  analyzing   whether   a
constitutional provision was self-executing:
     First,  a self-executing provision should do more  than
     express  only general principles;  it may describe  the
     right  in detail, including the means for its enjoyment
     and   protection.   *  *  *   [S]econd,  ordinarily   a
     self-executing provision does not contain  a  directive
     to the legislature for further action.  * * *  [T]hird,
     the legislative history may be particularly informative
     as  to  the  provision's intended  operation.   *  *  *
     Finally, a decision for or against self-execution  must
     harmonize with the scheme of rights established in  the
     constitution as a whole."   Shields, 658  A.2d  at  928
     (citing   Convention  Center  Referendum  Committee  v.
     Board  of Elections and Ethics, 399 A.2d 550, 552 (D.C.
     Ct. App.1979)). (Emphasis added).
Bandoni v. State, 715 A.2d at 587 (R.I. 1998).
          a.   The First Criterion
             i.   The   right  to  justice  without  purchase  is
          described in detail.
      Bandoni’s  first criterion is: “a self-executing  provision
should  do  more  than express only general  principles;  it  may
describe  the  right  in  detail, including  the  means  for  its
enjoyment and protection.”  Article 1, Section 5  meets Bandoni’s
first  criterion: there is a description of the right, and  there
is  included  within  Article 1, Section  5  the  means  for  its
enjoyment  and  protection.  As has earlier  been  shown  in  the
opinion  of Chief Judge Durfee in Perce there is a Constitutional
right  to  justice  without purchase.  This is  not  an  abstract
right, or a right based upon general principles.  Rhode Islanders
enjoy  the right not to be asked or compelled to pay for justice.
Article  1,  Section 5 of the Rhode Island Constitution  protects
citizens  from having to pay state officials for justice, just as
surely  as  the  Fourth Amendment to United  States  Constitution
protects   citizens  from  unauthorized  searches  and  seizures.
Moreover,  Sherman’s right not to have a judge take a portion  of
the  money a jury awarded him, is as clear and as fundamental  as
Bivens’  right not to have FBI agents search his home  without  a
warrant5.   The right to justice without purchase is a “concrete”
right.  Indeed, the trial court holds that Article 1, Section 5's
right  to  justice  without purchase is a  clear  mandate:  “[the
language  of  Article  1, Section 5 clearly mandates  that  every
person  should be able to procure justice without  purchase  –  a
fundamental   principle  of  our  judicial  system  with   which,
obviously,  there can be no quarrel.” [Appendix,  Exhibit  1,  p.
          ii.   A  person  denied his right  to  justice  without
          purchase ought to have a remedy.
     To be self-executing, not only must there be an actual right
in  issue,  but the Constitutional provision should  provide  the
means  for its enforcement and enjoyment. The Court, in  Bandoni,
analyzed  whether  the framers of the victims’  rights  amendment
expressly  provided a cause of action for damages.6   In  Bandoni
the  Court  concluded that the deletion of a  sentence  expressly
providing  that crime victims “shall have recourse in  the  laws”
and  the  insertion  in  its  place of  the  clause  “such  other
compensation  as  the  state  may provide”  was  the  substantive
amendment  that  proved that the framers of the  victims’  rights
amendment  had  considered  a  private  right  of  action  as  an
enforcement  mechanism  and  that  the  Committee  on  Style  and
Drafting  had  specifically rejected it.7     Unlike  Article  1,
Section  23,  interpreted  in  Bandoni,  Article  1,  Section   5
specifically provides that there shall be a  a remedy for  wrongs
suffered, and that remedy shall be by recourse to the laws.   The
first sentence of Article 1, Section 5 states:
     “Entitlement to remedies for injuries and wrongs ...  –
     Every  person within this state ought to find a certain
     remedy,  by  having  recourse  to  the  laws,  for  all
     injuries  or  wrongs  which may be  received  in  one’s
     person, property or character.”
This  right to a remedy by recourse to the laws contained  within
Article  1, Section 5 is an express constitutional private  right
of action.  'The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists
in  the right of every individual to claim the protection of  the
laws  whenever  he  receives an injury.' Marbury  v.  Madison,  1
Cranch 137, 163 (1803).  Sherman has a Constitutional right to  a
remedy  for  all  injuries and wrongs committed  against  him  by
Almeida,  in  his official capacity, and the means  provided  for
Sherman’s  enjoyment  of this right is specified  in  Article  1,
Section 5 as by having recourse to the laws.
          b.    The Second Criterion  - The General Assembly
          has  no express mandate to implement the right  to
          justice without purchase.
     Bandoni states that the lack of an express mandate directing
the  General Assembly to implement the right, ordinarily tips the
scales in favor of a conclusion that the constitutional right  is
self-executing.    Whereas Article 1,  Section  5  of  the  Rhode
Island  Constitution lacks an express mandate  that  the  General
Assembly implement this right, the second criterion also supports
the conclusion that this provision is self-executing.
          c.    The Third Criterion - As in Bivens  the
          legislative history is silent on the issue of
          private right of action.
      In  Bandoni there was legislative history for the Court  to
review  to assess the intent of the framers of Article 1, Section
23,  the  victims’ rights amendment.  Article 1,  Section  5  was
adopted  at the time of our original Constitution as one  of  the
fundamental rights of Rhode Islanders, and appellant knows of  no
specific discussion regarding whether the General Assembly should
be   given  exclusive  authority  to  provide  remedies  for  the
violation of this right.  As such, legislative history is absent,
and  the  analysis is more akin to the problem the United  States
Supreme Court faced in Bivens.
d.        The Fourth Criterion
      As  the  first  three criteria lead to the conclusion  that
Article  1,  Section 5 is self-executing, Bandoni  requires  that
this conclusion then be analyzed to determine if it “harmonize[s]
with  the scheme of rights established in the constitution  as  a
whole.8"  Bandoni v. State, 715 A.2d at 587 (R.I. 1998),  citing,
Shields, 658 A.2d at 928.  The Superior Court denied Sherman  his
constitutional right to sue Almeida for damages because it  found
the  remedy  of  damages against  Judge Almeida in  his  official
capacity to be unnecessary and inappropriate. The Superior  Court
held  that  a  damage action against Judge Almeida is unnecessary
because  other remedies are available to Sherman, and  the  Court
also  found the claim to be inappropriate because, in the Court’s
view, it  undermined judicial independence.  Sherman respectfully
disagrees.    Sherman needs a damage claim against Judge  Almeida
to  vindicate his rights: there is no other meaningful remedy. In
this  case,  a  damage  claim against a  judge  in  his  official
capacity  is also entirely appropriate because Judge Almeida  was
actually  guilty  of selling a judicial opinion.   In  this  case
abrogation  of  judicial immunity is appropriate  because  it  is
Judge  Almeida’s conduct, not Sherman’s conduct, that  poses  the
real  threat  to judicial independence.  Sherman’s  damage  claim
against  a  corrupt Judge harmonizes with the  scheme  of  rights
established in the constitution as a whole, because it provides a
needed remedy to vindicate an individual’s constitutional rights,
while to serves to promote public confidence in the judiciary  by
showing  that  the judiciary will allow no man to  place  himself
above and beyond the remedies provided for by law.
     i.   Sherman has no other meaningful remedy.
     The Superior Court finds a damage action unnecessary because
it holds that Sherman has other remedies under Article 1, Section
5.   The  Superior Court’s search for remedies other  than  money
damages  which  may be available to secure the right  to  justice
without  purchase  is  in  accord with  Bandoni  which  held  the
conclusion  that  a  right secured by our Constitution  is  self-
executing,  in itself,  “would not necessarily  support  a  claim
for  damages.”  Bandoni,  715 A.2d at 594.  According to  Bandoni
Article 1, Section 5, only forbids the total denial of access  to
the courts for the adjudication of a recognized claim. See, e.g.,
Kennedy  v.  Cumberland  Engineering  Co.,  471  A.2d  195,   200
(R.I.1984)(statute   requiring  personal-injury   claim   to   be
commenced  within  ten  years  of  the  date  product  was  first
purchased,  regardless of the date of injury,  completely  denied
the  plaintiff access to court).  See  Figueroa v. State, 61 Haw.
369,  604 P.2d 1198, 1206 (1979);  Brown v. State, 89 N.Y.2d 172,
652  N.Y.S.2d  223, 674 N.E.2d 1129, 1138 (1996);   Shields,  658
A.2d  at  930.   See also Jennifer Friesen, State  Constitutional
Law:   Litigating  Individual Rights,  Claims,  and  Defenses,  §
7.05[1],  at  7-14  (1995)  (court  may  provide  injunctive   or
declaratory  relief,  as  opposed  to  the  specific  remedy   of
      First,  courts  have held that a damage  action  may  be  a
necessary and appropriate means to vindicate the right to justice
without  purchase  provision  of a  state  constitution.   Courts
construing   provisions in their state constitutions  similar  to
Article  1, Section 5 of the Rhode Island Constitution  recognize
that  these cases frequently involve flagrant abuses of  official
power, and that the remedy of money damages is both necessary and
appropriate  to prevent fraud.  An Illinois appellate  court  has
addressed this precise issue in a case arising out of the bribery
of  a  United States Circuit Court Judge. Skelly Oil  Company  v.
Universal   Oil  Products  Company,  338  Ill.  App.  79   (1949)
(Feinberg, P.J.).  Defendant Universal Oil Products ["Universal"]
bribed  a United States Circuit Court Judge to obtain a favorable
judgment  in a patent infringement suit.  Universal then  set  up
the  corrupt opinion and judgment as res judicata in a series  of
other  patent infringement suits. Skelly Oil Company, one of  the
victims  of  this corrupt scheme, sued Universal  for  litigation
costs  expended  in defending against Universal's  claim  of  res
judicata  and for exemplary damages. In refusing to  dismiss  the
complaint  on  defendant's theory that no  cognizable  claim  was
stated  under law against Universal the appellate panel in Skelly
Oil  Company based its legal analysis on Article II, § 19 of  the
Illinois  State  Constitution  of  1870,  a  provision  virtually
identical to Article 1, Section 5 of Rhode Island's Constitution.
Skelly  Oil  Company relied on the "shocking" and  "unprecedented
type of fraud" to conclude that the "situation demands a remedy."
The  court  held  that  the  right to  justice  without  purchase
provision  in  its  state  constitution  is  self-executing   and
supports a claim for damages:
     The  designation of the action is of no moment.  If the
     facts, as set up in the instant complaint, disclose the
     unprecedented type of fraud we are dealing  with,  then
     the  situation  demands a remedy.  The framers  of  the
     State  Constitution of 1870, Article  II,  §19,  wisely
     inserted this provision:
     'Every  person  ought to find a certain remedy  in  the
     laws  for all injuries and wrongs which he may  receive
     in  his  person, property or reputation;  he  ought  to
     obtain,  by law, right and justice freely, and  without
     being  obliged to purchase it, completely  and  without
     denial, promptly and without delay.'
     This  is  a clear mandate to the courts, that  wherever
     the  legislature  has failed to provide  a  remedy  the
     courts must.  This constitutional protection should  be
     here  invoked, especially when the legislature has  not
     provided  a  remedy.  Courts should not be helpless  to
     find a remedy for a fraud of the instant type.  If  the
     statute fails to provide a remedy, the court can, as it
     has   in  many  instances  under  the  common  law  and
     equitable principles.  In the cases of fraud and deceit
     the remedy is generally provided for by the courts, not
     by   statute.    It   is  perfectly  clear   that   the
     Constitution had not in mind only remedies  created  by
     legislative enactment..."
Id.,  at 84-85. In allowing plaintiff to proceed with it’s damage
action,  Skelly also held that: "courts of justice had better  be
abolished if they can afford no redress in such situations."  Id,
at 92 citing Spaids v. Barrett, 57 Ill. 289.
      Similarly,  a North Carolina appellate court,  interpreting
the  “right  to  justice” provision of that state's constitution,
Article 1, Section 18,  held that a person who commits an act  of
embracery  is liable to the one damaged thereby.  Employers  Ins.
of  Wausau  v.  Hall, 270 S.E.2d 617 (1980),  cert.  denied,  276
S.E.2d 283 (1981).  An attorney, who was representing a plaintiff
in  a tort claim against a hospital, personally contacted a juror
and attempted to influence her verdict.  Thereafter, the attorney
pled  guilty  to  the  common law felony  of  embracery  and  was
sentenced to prison.  His law license was subsequently suspended.
The  insurance company which paid for the hospital's  defense  in
the  tort claim brought suit against the attorney to recover  its
costs.   The  Court  found  that  this  constitutional  provision
provided a money damages remedy to one harmed by embracery.
       Fraud  upon  litigants,  upon  the  Courts  and  upon  the
Constitution  are matters serious enough that both equitable  and
legal  remedies  may  be  necessary and  proper.   In  Matter  of
Almeida,  611 A.2d 1375 (R.I. 1992) the Court found it  necessary
and  appropriate  to   analyze  a  broad  array  of  remedies  to
vindicate  the public’s interest when  Judge Almeida committed  a
fraud  upon our Courts.  Both equitable and legal remedies should
be  considered because the offense of selling justice  undermines
the  constitutional basis of judicial power:  "It  is  our  clear
duty,  however, to ensure that no judge attempts to  put  himself
above  the  law.   Judicial power has its limits.   A  judge  who
transcends  those  limits strikes at the  vitality  of  the  very
constitution under which he holds his judicial office."    In  re
Benoit,  487 A.2d at 1162.” Matter of Almeida, 611 A.2d at  1382.
Similarly,  a  broad array of remedies should be available  to  a
litigant  when a Judge has committed fraud upon the  litigant  by
exacting  money  from  his jury award.  Regarding  violations  of
Article  1,  Section 5 the Superior Court said:  “Obviously,  the
aggrieved  person  should be able to set aside  any  judgment  or
order  obtained by the unauthorized purchase or sale of  justice,
on  appeal or otherwise.  See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 646, 651
(1872).”  [Appendix, Exhibit 1, p. 14].  That is  precisely  true
and  it  is  what  Sherman attempted to  do.   Upon  learning  of
Almeida’s corrupt decision and his corrupt disbursements from the
jury  verdict, Sherman, over one year before filing  this  damage
action,  filed  a petition in equity in the Rhode Island  Supreme
Court  seeking  to  set  aside  the  judgment  obtained  by   the
unauthorized  purchase of justice. Estate of Sherman  v.  Almeida
610  A.2d  104  (R.I.  1992).   In that case,  the  Rhode  Island
Supreme  Court  ruled that if fraud had been committed  by  Judge
Almeida  upon  Sherman and upon the Courts, the corrupt  judgment
issued  by  Almeida must be set aside for fraud, and  the  Court,
considering the matter factually premature, remanded  the  equity
petition  for  further proceedings consistent with  its  opinion.
The  Estate of Sherman v. Almeida  610 A.2d 104 (1992); See also,
Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co., 322 US 238,   64  S
Ct  997, 88 L Ed 1250 (1944) reh den 322 US 772, 64 S Ct 1281, 88
L  Ed  1596 (1944).  Fraud, once disclosed, “demands the exercise
of  the  historic  power  of  equity to  set  aside  fraudulently
begotten judgments.”9  Hazel-Atlas Glass Co., 322 U.S. at 245.
      But,  the  fact  that Sherman may have an equitable  remedy
should not exclude a damage remedy against Judge Almeida for  the
violation   of  his  constitutional  right  to  justice   without
purchase.   Moreover, in this particular bribery  situation,  the
equitable  relief afforded through setting aside the judgment  is
inadequate  because the bribe was paid using money  belonging  to
the    victim  of  the  bribery  scheme.   Equitable  relief   is
inadequate  because it will not help Sherman get back from  Judge
Almeida  the  money  Judge Almeida exacted  from  Sherman’s  jury
award.    Basic  principles  of restitution  require  that  Judge
Almeida pay back the Eighteen Thousand Dollars ($18,000.00), more
or  less, that  he took.   After all, the money the jury  awarded
was  supposed  to  be used by Sherman, not by Almeida.  Moreover,
equitable  relief would not provide Sherman with the  opportunity
to  ask a jury to award him punitive damages against former Judge
Almeida.   Sherman’s claim against Almeida is much  like  Bivens’
claim  against the unknown named agents of the Federal Bureau  of
Narcotics:  “[i]t is apparent that damages in some  form  is  the
only  possible  remedy for someone in Bivens’ alleged  position.”
Bivens, supra, 403 U.S. at 409-10 (Harlan, J. concurring)
      The Superior Court also indicates that Sherman need not sue
Judge  Almeida under Article 1, Section 5 because this  provision
provides  Sherman with the remedy of money damages against  “non-
judicial  actors.”  [Appendix,  Exhibit  1,  p.  14].   Appellant
disagrees because a remedy under Article 1, Section 5 against non-
judicial  actors should not exclude the possibility of  a  remedy
against  judicial  actors.   It is  imperative  that  anyone  who
commits  a fraud upon our courts by selling justice, whether  the
wrongdoer  be a litigant, an attorney, a juror, or  a  judge,  be
accountable  to  the  injured party in  damages.   While  Sherman
should  also be able to, and indeed has,  sued the attorneys  who
participated with Judge Almeida in the fraud, it does not  follow
that  Article  1,  Section 5 is limited to actions  against  non-
judicial  actors.  Moreover, while Sherman can sue the  attorneys
for  the  money  they  corruptly  took  from  Sherman’s  judgment
proceeds,  he  cannot  sue these attorneys for  the  money  Judge
Almeida corruptly took from Sherman’s judgment proceeds.10   Suing
the   “non   judicial   actors”  does  not  vindicate   Sherman’s
constitutional rights with respect to the judicial actor who took
his money, and the remedy the Superior Court offers is inadequate
because   it  does  not  address  the  wrong  Sherman   suffered.
Moreover, the plain language of Article 1, Section 5 states  that
when  justice is sold in the State of Rhode Island a person ought
to  find  a  remedy for all injuries and wrongs he suffers  as  a
result  of this violation of his constitutional rights,  and  not
just for injuries and wrongs committed by “non-judicial actors.”
      The Superior Court also  asserts that Sherman need not  sue
Judge  Almeida  in  his  official capacity  for  damages  because
Sherman  may have a remedy against Judge Almeida “for any  action
taken by him with regard to the purchase and sale of justice that
was not taken in his official capacity.” [Appendix, Exhibit 1, p.
14].   On this issue the Superior Court is incorrect because  the
facts in this case show that Judge Almeida’s corrupt issuance  of
a  judicial opinion was committed in his official capacity  as  a
      The  Rhode Island Supreme Court has already found that  the
corrupt  acts  committed by Almeida were "integrally  intertwined
with his judicial role:"
     The  petitioner  (Judge Almeida)  admittedly  committed
     acts  violative  of these high ethical  standards  when
     serving as a justice of the Superior Court, abusing his
     position  as  a  judge and betraying the confidence  of
     both   the   public  and  the  profession   by   acting
     unethically in the interest of personal gain.  The acts
     committed   by   petitioner  were  grave   indeed   and
     integrally  intertwined with his judicial role.   These
     offenses,  abusive of his position, were not single  or
     isolated but rather continued on a regular basis  until
     a complaint was ultimately filed and certain facts were
     revealed. (emphasis supplied).
Matter  of Almeida, 611 A.2d at 26.  Almeida was corrupt  in  his
judicial capacity:
     "By  his  judicial misconduct, petitioner has  breached
     the  public trust by committing acts violative  of  his
     honored  position as a respected jurist.   His  actions
     motivated by the desire for personal gain have operated
     to harm public trust and confidence in the Judiciary as
     a whole and to affect adversely the honor and integrity
     of  the very position he held and the capacity in which
     he served. (emphasis supplied).
Id. at 27.   In Count 3 Almeida is properly sued in the "capacity
in  which  he  served,"  as  a former Associate  Justice  of  the
Superior Court.11.
      The  Superior Court, citing Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522,
104  S.Ct.  1970  (1984) states that injunctive relief  might  be
available against Judge Almeida.  However, an injunction is not a
remedy that was or is of realistic value to Sherman.  Sherman was
in a persistent vegetative state at the time Judge Almeida issued
his decision corruptly dividing up the jury award between Sherman
and   his  attorney,  Thomas  Hutton.   There  was  no  realistic
possibility  that Sherman could seek an injunction against  Judge
Almeida because Almeida’s corrupt acts were done in secret.   For
an  injunction  to be effective Sherman would have  had  to  have
known  that Judge Almeida was going to exact money from his  jury
award prior to the issuance of Almeida’s corrupt decision12.   An
injunction against Almeida does Sherman no good now because Judge
Almeida has already taken Sherman’s money, and has been convicted
of  bribery  and removed from his judicial office.   Accordingly,
the  damage  to  Sherman  is  already  done,  and  there  is   no
continuing,  ongoing  wrong  by  former  Judge  Almeida   against
Sherman.  As Mr. Justice Harlan said regarding Bivens: “It  would
be a rare case indeed in which an individual in Bivens’ situation
will  be  able to obviate the harm by securing injunctive  relief
from  any  court.”  Bivens, supra, 403 U.S. at 410  (Harlan,  J.,
concurring).   Moreover, requests for injunctive  relief  against
judges  must  be  strictly scrutinized,  as  injunctions  against
judges  undermine judicial independence as surely  as  do  damage
awards.   See  Joseph  R. Weisberger, The  Twilight  of  Judicial
Independence  -  Pulliam  v. Allen, 19 Suffolk  U.  L.  REV.  537
      The Superior Court also states that Article 1, Section 5 of
the Constitution could give rise to the removal or suspension  of
a  Judge who violates its provisions, and that Judge Almeida  may
have  criminal  responsibility or liability  under  the  victims’
indemnity fund.13 [Appendix, Exhibit 1, p.14].  First, the  right
to  justice without purchase established in Article 1, Section  5
is   not a criminal statute, it is a constitutional right of  the
people.  The remedy of removal or suspension of a judge is not an
individual  right for which there is a private cause  of  action.
Removal and suspension of judges is entrusted exclusively  to the
Rhode  Island Supreme Court,14 and the Rhode Island Supreme Court
only  makes  such determinations after thorough investigation  by
the  Commission of Judicial Tenure and Discipline. See R.I.  Gen.
Laws  §  8-16-1 et. seq.  The remedy of removal or suspension  is
used for judges who violate the Canons of Judicial Ethics or  who
commit  crimes,  and this remedy is not a part  of  enforcing  an
individual’s constitutional right to justice without purchase.
     In fact, the disciplinary proceedings against Almeida in the
Commission  on Judicial Tenure and Discipline and  in  the  Rhode
Island  Supreme Court did not  provide Sherman with a remedy  for
the   wrong  Almeida  committed  against  him.   Sherman   sought
restitution   from  Almeida  in  the  disciplinary   proceedings.
Sherman  filed  a  petition  to intervene  in  that  disciplinary
proceeding  both  before the Commission and in  this  Court.   By
Order  dated  January  9,  1992 the Rhode  Island  Supreme  Court
rejected   this   petition   stating   simply:   “After   careful
consideration  of  the  motion, we are of the  opinion  that  the
Estate  of Paul K. Sherman lacks standing to intervene as prayed.
Accordingly,  the  motion  to intervene  is  denied.”  [Appendix,
Exhibit 4].
ii         Judicial immunity preserves judicial independence, and
          judicial independence must be guarded jealously.
      Judicial  immunity is a common law defense available  to  a
judge acting in his official capacity. Mireles v. Waco, 502  U.S.
9,  116 L.Ed 2d 9, 112 S.Ct 286 (1991); Forrester v. White,   484
U.S.  219, 98 L.Ed 2d 555, 108 S.Ct 538 (1988); Dennis v. Sparks,
449  U.S.  24,  66  L.Ed 2d 185, 101 S.Ct 183  (1980);  Stump  v.
Sparkman,  435  U.S. 349, 55 L.Ed 2d 331, 98  S.Ct  1099  (1978);
Pierson  v.  Ray,  386 U.S. 547, 18 L.Ed 2d  288,  87  S.Ct  1213
(1967).   Not  only is the doctrine of judicial immunity  law  in
Rhode  Island,  Calhoun v. City of Providence, 390 A.2d 350 (R.I.
1978); Cok v. Constentino, 876 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989); Hurley  v.
Fuyat,  WL  930891  (R.I.Super. 1994), but it has  recently  been
stated that the “concept of judicial ...  immunity remains  alive
and well.”  Bandoni, supra, 715 A.2d at 595.   However, until the
decision  of the Superior Court below, no Rhode Island Court  had
ever extended the concept of judicial immunity to hold that it is
proper  to apply the doctrine to a judge who has  has pled guilty
to  felony  charges  of  solicitation of a  bribe  and  has  been
convicted of the offense.
      The Superior Court's ruling is purportedly grounded on  the
importance   of   judicial  immunity  in   maintaining   judicial
independence.15   The trial court states the  importance  of  the
           "As the U.S. Supreme Court observed in Pierson v. Ray,
     when speaking of judicial immunity, 'the immunity is not for
     the  benefit  of a malicious or corrupt judge, but  for  the
     benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the  judges
     should  be  at  liberty  to exercise  their  functions  with
     independence and without fear of consequences.   It  is  the
     judges duty to decide all cases within his jurisdiction that
     are  brought before him, including controversial cases  that
     arouse  the  most  intense feelings in the  litigants.   His
     errors may be corrected on appeal, but he should not have to
     fear   that  unsatisfied  litigants  may  hound   him   with
     litigation charging malice or corruption.  Imposing  such  a
     burden  on judges would contribute not to fearless decision-
     making  but  to  intimidation.' 386  U.S.  547,  554.   Such
     judicial  independence as recognized  by  the  Rhode  Island
     Supreme Court in Calhoun v. City of Providence, 390 A.2d  at
     356,  is at the very core of our judicial system and  courts
     have guarded it jealously. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349."
[Appendix,  Exhibit  1, pp. 8-9].  The trial  court  is  correct:
judicial  immunity helps preserve judicial independence, judicial
independence  is  at  the very core of our judicial  system,  and
courts  have  guarded  it jealously.  However,  appellant  cannot
believe  that Rhode Island  judges would fail to discharge  their
duties  faithfully and fearlessly should this Supreme Court  rule
that  a  lawsuit may be brought against a judge who  is  actually
guilty  of  perverting his judicial power by selling  a  judicial
opinion.  Chief Justice Cockburn long ago addressed this issue:
     I   cannot  believe  that  judges  ...  would  fail  to
     discharge   their   duty  faithfully   and   fearlessly
     according to their oaths and consciences ...  from  any
     fear  of exposing themselves to actions at law.   I  am
     persuaded  that  the number of such  actions  would  be
     small  and would be easily disposed of.  While  on  the
     other  hand,  I  can  easily conceive  cases  in  which
     judicial  opportunity might be so perverted and  abused
     for   the  purpose  of  injustice  as  that,  on  sound
     principles,  the  authors of such  wrong  ought  to  be
     responsible to the parties wronged.”
Dawkins  v.  Lord  Paulet,  LR  5  QB  94,  110  (C.J.  Cockburn,
dissenting), cited in, Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. at 566  (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
      In  his  law  review  article Mr. Chief Justice  Weisberger
explains  the importance of the doctrine of judicial immunity  in
part, by quoting from Mr. Justice Field in Bradley v. Fisher,  80
U.S.  (13  Wall.)  335 (1871).  In Bradley it is  said  that  the
doctrine of judicial immunity is needed because it is easy for  a
losing party, whose deepest feelings may have been excited by the
controversy,  to  ascribe improper motives on  the  part  of  the
     Controversies  involving  not  merely  great  pecuniary
     interests,  but  the  liberty  and  character  of   the
     parties,   and   consequently  exciting   the   deepest
     feelings,  are being constantly determined in [superior
     courts],  in which there is great conflict in  evidence
     and great doubt as to the law which should govern their
     decisions.  It is this class of cases which impose upon
     the  judge the severest labor, and often create in  his
     mind  a  painful sense of responsibility.   Yet  it  is
     precisely in this class of cases that the losing  party
     feels  most keenly the decision against him,  and  most
     readily  accepts  anything but  the  soundness  of  the
     decision  in explanation of the actions of  the  judge.
     Just  in  proportion to the strength of his convictions
     of  the correctness of his own view of the case  is  he
     apt  to complain of the judgment against him, and  from
     complaints of the judgment to pass to the ascription of
     improper  motives  to the judge ...  If  civil  actions
     could  be  maintained in such cases against the  judge,
     because  the losing party should see fit to  allege  in
     his complaint that the acts of the judge were done with
     partiality,   or   maliciously,   or   corruptly,   the
     protection essential to judicial independence would  be
     entirely   swept   away.    Few  persons   sufficiently
     irritated  to institute an action against a  judge  for
     his   judicial  acts  would  hesitate  to  ascribe  any
     character to the acts which would be essential  to  the
     maintenance  of  the  action.   Justice  Field  further
     stated that if a judge could be compelled to answer  in
     a  civil action for his judicial acts his office  would
     be  degraded  and his usefulness destroyed.  [footnotes
Joseph  R.  Weisberger, The Twilight of Judicial  Independence  -
Pulliam  v. Allen, 19 Suffolk U. L. REV. at 541-542.  It  is  for
these  compelling  reasons  that the  right  to  justice  without
purchase secured by Article 1, Section 5 may be said  to conflict
with  the doctrine of judicial immunity.  Accordingly, a  lawsuit
for  damages brought by a litigant against a judge under  Article
1, Section 5 is, generally, not appropriate because it wrongfully
undermines  judicial  independence, and in  such  cases  judicial
immunity should act as a complete bar.
     But, what if a Judge stands up in the courtroom, pulls out a
firearm,  and  demands a litigant to turn over the  cash  in  his
wallet?   Would the Rhode Island Supreme Court say  that  such  a
judge  is protected by the doctrine of judicial immunity  from  a
civil  action seeking to recover the cash stolen from the wallet?
In  reality, Judge Almeida’s act of exacting money from Sherman’s
jury award  is no different. Indeed, the amounts stolen from  the
plaintiff  were far greater than if Sherman were  robbed  of  his
          iii.  When  it is possible in practice to  confine  the
          abrogation of judicial immunity to a complaint  against
          a  judge  who  was actually guilty of  bribery,  it  is
          monstrous to deny recovery.
      Rhode Island courts interpreting Article 1, Section 5  have
at times abrogated an immunity or other bar to a remedy, on other
occasions  the  immunity  or  bar has  been  preserved.  Compare,
Lemoine  v.  Martineau, 342 A.2d 616 (R.I. 1975) and  Kennedy  v.
Cumberland  Engineering Co., Inc., 471 A.2d 195  (R.I.  1984)  to
Fournier v. Miriam Hospital, 175 A.2d 298 (R.I. 1961).  This same
case  by case review balancing the need for a remedy against  the
public  policy expressed in the immunity doctrine is,  generally,
found  in  all  states  with  similar constitutional  provisions.
Appellant  submits  that a general rule that  might  be  said  to
harmonize the diverse holdings is that if there is injury  courts
should  attempt  to provide a remedy unless strong  arguments  of
public policy justify legislative or judicially created immunity.
Cases  demonstrating this principle include Lewis v.  Lewis,  351
N.E.2d  526  (Mass. 1976) (Massachusetts Supreme  Judicial  Court
opinion  abrogating  common-law rule of  interspousal  immunity),
Mayle  v.  Pennsylvania  Dept.  of  Hwys.,  479  Pa.  384  (1978)
(Pennsylvania   Supreme  Court  decision   abrogating   sovereign
immunity);  Sax v. Vottelier, 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex  .1983)  (Texas
Supreme Court opinion abrogating statute of limitations).
      Sherman respectfully submits that a proper decision  should
balance  the worth of Almeida’s judicial immunity defense against
the  worth  of  the  constitutional  right  in  issue.   In  this
balancing process the court should determine whether the doctrine
of  judicial immunity should be applied, and whether the doctrine
could  be  tailored  as the facts and natural  equities  of  this
particular case demand. Kintz v. Harriger, 99 Ohio St.  240,  124
N.E.  168, 12 A.L.R. 1240 (1919) (abrogating common law  immunity
granted  individuals testifying before grand juries with  respect
to an individual actually guilty of perjury).
      When  the  immunity involves the independence  of  a  state
official  in  the conduct of his official duties, when  balancing
the  harms,  it  has  been thought in the  end  better  to  leave
unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject
those  who  do  try  to do their duty to the  constant  dread  of
retaliation. But, this is only so because in most cases it is not
possible  in  practice to confine such complaints to the  guilty.
Then  Chief Judge of the Second Circuit, Learned Hand in Gregoire
v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2nd Cir.1949), states the rule:
     It  does indeed go without saying that an official, who
     is  in fact guilty of using his powers ... for any  ...
     personal  motive  not connected with the  public  good,
     should not escape liability for the injuries he may  so
     cause;  and if it were possible in practice to  confine
     such complaints to the guilty, it would be monstrous to
     deny  recovery.  The justification for doing so is that
     it  is  impossible to know whether the  claim  is  well
     founded  until  the case has been tried,  and  that  to
     submit  all  officials, the innocent  as  well  as  the
     guilty,  to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable
     danger  of its outcome, would dampen the ardor  of  all
     but  the  most resolute, or the most irresponsible,  in
     the unflinching discharge of their duties.
Gregoire, 177 F.2d at 581.
      According  to  Chief  Judge Hand immunity  should  only  be
abrogated  when  it  is  possible in  practice  to  confine  such
complaints to the guilty.  In Sherman's original brief he argued:
"Many  of  the  compelling reasons for judicial  immunity  become
significantly  less compelling subsequent to  a  judge's  removal
from  office,  indictment  and  criminal  conviction."    It   is
possible in practice to confine lawsuits against judges to  cases
where  the  judge  is  actually guilty of  violating  Article  1,
Section 5 of the Constitution.  By requiring that a plaintiff  be
required to prove that the judge sued has been disbarred, removed
from  office, indicted, and criminally convicted for bribery,  it
is  possible  to  confine  lawsuits against  judges  to  lawsuits
against  corrupt, guilty judges17.  Such lawsuits would not  have
improper  motive  because it is impossible to conceive  that  the
Attorney  General, the Superior Court, the Commission on Judicial
Tenure  and Discipline, and the Rhode Island Supreme Court  would
all   allow  a  judge  to  be  disbarred,  removed  from  office,
convicted  of bribery, and sentenced to jail had that  judge  not
actually been guilty of corruption and bribery.
      There  is nothing novel about requiring that a civil action
for   damages  be  contingent  on  the  outcome  of  a   criminal
proceeding.   Malicious prosecution lawsuits  are  contingent  on
proof  that  the  criminal proceeding terminated  in  plaintiff’s
favor.    Soares  v. Ann & Hope of Rhode Island, Inc.,  637  A.2d
339,  345  (R.I. 1994); Solitro v. Moffatt, 523 A.2d 858,  861-62
(R.I.1987);  Nagy v. McBurney, 120 R.I. 925, 392 A.2d  365  (R.I.
1978).   Similarly,  the standard should be that  no  suit  under
Article  1,  Section 5 could be brought against  a  Rhode  Island
judge  absent proof that a criminal proceeding against that judge
terminated  in  an  adjudication  of  guilt  for  bribery.   This
standard  is  needed because to permit Judge  Almeida  to  escape
liability,  and to deny Sherman restitution and punitive  damages
when  it  is  possible in practice to confine the  abrogation  of
judicial  immunity to a judge who is actually  guilty  of  taking
money  from  the  proceeds  that a  jury  awarded  this  severely
disabled man would be monstrous.
      In reviewing the case law in states with provisions similar
to Article 1, Section 5 of the Rhode Island Constitution, the one
case  demonstrating an analysis closest to the one that plaintiff
believes  should  be  applied  by this  Court  in  assessing  the
legitimacy  of defendant Almeida's judicial immunity  defense  is
Kintz v. Harriger, 99 Ohio St. 240, 124 N.E. 168, 12 A.L.R.  1240
(1919).   In  Kintz  the Ohio Supreme Court resolved  a  conflict
between  the constitutional right to a remedy for injury and  the
common-law  immunity  afforded to  grand  jury  testimony.   Like
judicial immunity, the immunity afforded grand jury testimony was
steeped  in  history  and  judicial precedent  and  there  was  a
compelling purpose underlying the doctrine.
      In  Kintz  the  Ohio  Supreme  Court  ruled  that  perjured
testimony given before a grand jury may be used as a basis for  a
civil  action  in  tort  and  is not privileged,  that  is,  such
perjured  testimony is not protected by public policy.  The  Ohio
Supreme Court in Kintz set forth the methodology of balancing the
right  to  remedy secured by their Constitution with  the  public
policy,  expressed in common-law, of preserving  the  secrecy  of
grand jury testimony.  While noting that the weight of precedents
for a century or more undoubtedly held grand jury testimony to be
privileged, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the issue should  be
resolved, not upon "mere precedent," but upon "fundamental  facts
and primary principles." Id., 12 A.L.R. at 1241.
      The  Court  in  Kintz found that the primary principle  was
enunciated in the language of § 16 of the Bill of Rights  of  the
Ohio  Constitution  of 1851, a provision similar  to  Article  1,
Section  5  of  the Rhode Island Constitution.  On the  issue  of
common-law  immunity afforded to grand jury testimony  the  Court
     Precedents  are  valuable for information,  admonition,
     and as milestones in the nation's progress. But they do
     not  necessarily imply the last word of  wisdom.   They
     are  not always to be adopted.  They are frequently  to
     be  avoided.  They are worth exactly what they weigh in
     right   and  reason  when  applied  to  the  particular
     circumstances  in  each  particular  case.   They  must
     always have due regard to the natural equities of  each
     special case.
Id.,  12  A.L.R.  at 1243.  While Almeida has certainly  provided
common-law   precedent  establishing  the  defense  of   judicial
immunity, the worth of this defense should be assessed in  regard
to   its   right  and  reason  when  applied  to  the  particular
circumstances  of  this case.  Further, in  deciding  whether  to
apply  judicial immunity as a bar to Sherman's claim, this  Court
should give due regard to the natural equities of the case.
      In  balancing a common law immunity against a right secured
by § 16 of the Ohio Bill of Rights, the Court stated:
     Our   written   public  policies  are  put   into   our
     constitutions,  our statutes, and ordinances,  but  our
     unwritten  public  policies rest  largely  in  judicial
     judgment  and  public  opinion.  Manifestly,  when  the
     Constitution of the state declares and defines  certain
     public  policies,  such  policies  must  be  paramount,
     though a score of statutes conflict and a multitude  of
     judicial  decisions  be to the  contrary.   No  general
     assembly is above the plain potential provisions of the
     Constitution, and no court, however sacred or powerful,
     has the right to declare any public policy that clearly
     contravenes  or  nullifies the rights declared  in  the
Id.,  12  A.L.R. at 1244.  The Constitutional prohibition against
the   sale  of  justice  is  in  our  written  Constitution   and
maintenance  and  preservation of this  right  is  the  paramount
obligation  of this Court.  When Justice Almeida, acting  in  his
capacity  as an Associate Justice of the Superior Court,  sold  a
judicial  opinion,  Almeida violated Paul K. Sherman's  right  to
justice without sale as secured by our written Constitution.   In
Kintz  the Ohio Supreme Court stated that courts do not have  the
right  to  declare any public policy that clearly contravenes  or
nullifies the rights declared in the Constitution.  In this case,
a  declaration  that  Judge Almeida is  immune  from  suit  would
contravene  and  nullify  Sherman's  right  to  justice   without
purchase as secured by our written constitution.
      Kintz found that the application of the common law doctrine
immunizing  grand  jury  testimony would be  improper  "jugglery"
because   applying  this  doctrine  to  perjured  testimony   was
inconsistent  with the administration of justice itself,  namely,
that justice must be administered based upon truth:
     What  is the particular policy under whose mask  it  is
     sought  to  invoke the absolute privilege of protection
     to   the  perjured  witness  in  this  case?    It   is
     undoubtedly regard for the ancient doctrine  of  giving
     absolute    immunity   and   protection   to   judicial
     proceedings  in due course of law.  But surely  such  a
     doctrine  can by no possible jugglery be applied  to  a
     court  of  justice  or to any of its  proceedings  -  a
     court, which is charged first, last, and all the  times
     with administering justice, based upon truth - when  it
     has  before  it  an obvious and palpable  case  of  the
     grossest injustice, based upon the grossest untruth.
Id.,  12  A.L.R.  at  1244-1245.  Kintz further  notes  that  the
application  of  an  immunity doctrine to  particular  facts  may
result in the grossest injustice, and when courts announce public
policy  that  works  such gross injustice, it  undermines  public
confidence in our courts:
     The egregious evil that would result to society, to the
     public,  and  to every private citizen from  announcing
     and sustaining such a doctrine of absolute privilege of
     immunity  to  perjurers  before  grand  juries  is   so
     manifest that no further argument would seem necessary.
     The whole duty of courts is to ascertain the facts, the
     truth,  in  any given controversy, and then  apply  the
     fundamental  principles of justice to that  truth,  and
     when by any species of jugglery it is claimed that  the
     courts  should announce a public policy that works  out
     the  greatest  injustice, bottomed  upon  the  grossest
     untruth   -   well,  it  is  just  such   hairsplitting
     distinctions   as  these  that  have   too   frequently
     undermined, and justly undermined, public confidence in
     our courts.
Id.,   12   A.L.R.  at  1245-1246.   Similarly,  announcing   and
sustaining  as  public policy that Judge Almeida enjoys  judicial
immunity  for  his act of selling justice in his  capacity  as  a
Justice  of the Superior Court when Judge Almeida pled guilty  to
soliciting a bribe in the Sherman case and was adjudicated by the
Superior  Court  as being actually guilty of having  solicited  a
bribe in the Sherman case would constitute a gross injustice that
might  well  undermine, and might be said  to  justly  undermine,
public  confidence  in our courts.  The very  foundation  of  our
judicial system is that justice is not for sale, and the  use  of
judicial  immunity  to bar a claim against a  judge  who  in  his
official  capacity  is actually guilty of selling  justice  is  a
"species  of  jugglery"  that  is  improper  and  should  not  be
countenanced by this Court.
      The  superior court misidentifies the conduct in this  case
that  poses the true threat to judicial independence.   Sherman's
civil  action against a corrupt judge poses no threat to judicial
independence.  It was Judge Almeida's dishonorable  conduct  that
posed a threat, and, for so long as full remedy is not had by  an
individual  harmed  by  his  corrupt acts,  Almeida's  misconduct
continues to pose a threat to judicial independence.
     At the core of the superior court's opinion is the assertion
that  judicial  immunity must be applied because  of  the  "wide,
wasting  and  harassing persecution [of judges]" that  the  judge
fears will occur "if once you break down the barrier [of judicial
immunity]."  Taffe v. Downes, Chief Justice of the  King's  Bench
(Court  of Common Pleas of Ireland 1813), reported in, Calder  v.
Halket,  13  Eng. Rep. 12 at 18 n.(a) (P.C. 1839).  The  superior
court's opinion that it must deny relief in this individual case,
regardless  of the justice of Sherman's cause, because  once  the
barrier of judicial immunity is broken down, there is no  way  to
prevent   other   judges  from  being  subjected   to   harassing
persecution  by disgruntled litigants overstates  the  case.   In
this  case  relief can be tailored in a way that will  leave  the
barrier  that  protects judges intact. The barrier that  prevents
lawsuits  against  judges  will remain impenetrable,  unless  the
judge is actually guilty of soliciting bribes.
       The   Court  in  Kintz  concluded  by  noting:  "[I]t   is
inexcusable,  especially on the part of a court,  to  extend  its
powers  for  the protection of such infamy." Id.,  12  A.L.R.  at
1247.   Similarly, this  Court should not extend its  powers  for
the  protection  of  Judge  Almeida's  infamous  acts.   Judicial
immunity is not warranted where, as here, a Justice has sold  the
rights of an individual who was without power to protect his  own
interests.   This  Court  has prevented and  should  continue  to
prevent  improper actions that “have jeopardized Paul’s  future.”
In  re  Paul  K. Sherman, supra,565 A.2d at 873.  To bar  Sherman
from recovering money that a jury awarded for his use and benefit
on  the  ground that the judge who wrongfully exacted  the  money
from the jury award is immune is monstrous, and  it violates  the
protection afforded by Article 1, Section 5 of our Constitution.
      The decision of the Superior Court should be reversed,  and
the matter should be remanded to allow Sherman the opportunity to
proceed  in  his claim under Article 1, Section 5  of  the  Rhode
Island  Constitution for money damages against Antonio S. Almeida
in  his  official capacity as a (former) Justice of the  Superior
                         Respectfully submitted,
                         The Estate of Paul K. Sherman
                         By its Attorney,

                         Robert Senville, Esq.
                         Sup. Ct. No. 4289
                         PO Box 4944
                         Rumford, RI 02916
I hereby certify that I have this 16th day of April, 1999 sent a
true copy of this Brief of Estate of Paul  K. Sherman by first
class mail postage prepaid addressed as follows:
J. Renn Olenn, Esq.
Olenn & Penza
530 Greenwich Ave.
Warwick, RI 02886
Thomas C. Angelone, Esq.
128 Dorrance St.
Providence, RI 02903
Richard Gonnella, Esq.
The Remington Building
91 Friendship St.
Providence, RI 02903
Peter A. DiBiase, Esq.
The Remington Building
91 Friendship St.
Providence, RI 02903
Mark W. Freel, Esq.
Edwards & Angell
2700 Hospital Trust Tower
Providence, RI 02903

1 The portion of Justice Almeida’s decision that showed favor to
both Hutton and Sherman, the award of pre and post-judgment
interest was reversed by the Supreme Court, the portion of
Justice Almeida’s decision that apportioned the jury award
between Hutton and Sherman, and which awarded Hutton 45% of the
net proceeds, was not reversed on appeal, and to date stands as
the final Order of the this Court. In re Paul K. Sherman, 565
A.2d 870 (R.I. 1989).
2 R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-7-3, regarding solicitation or acceptance
of a bribe by a public official provides, in part: “No ... public
official shall corruptly accept, or obtain or agree to accept, or
attempt to obtain from any person, for him[self] [or] for any
other person, any gift or valuable consideration as an inducement
or reward for doing or forbearing to do, or for having done or
forborne to do, any act in relation to his ... principal, master,
employer, or state, city, or town of which he or she is an
official, or for showing or forbearing to show favor or disfavor
to any person in relation to the business of his ... principal,
master, employer, or state, city, or town of which he ... is an
3    Ruffhead translates the pertinent language of Mag. Char.
Hen. III, chapt. 29 as follows: "We will sell to no man, we will
not deny, or defer, to any man, either Justice or Right."
Ruffhead, Owen (ed.), Statutes-at-Large, Vol.I (Magna Charta -
End Henry 6) p.8.
4    The Fourth Amendment targets abusive infringements on an
individual's right to privacy, and by implication provides a
private right of action against those officials, including
federal agents, who violate this right.  By analogy to Bivens,
Article 1, Section 5 of the Rhode Island Constitution targets
abusive infringements of an individual's right to obtain justice
freely, without purchase, and by implication provides a private
right against those officials, including judges, who violate this
5    The right to justice without purchase is unlike the crime
victims’ rights secured under Article 1, Section 23 where there
is only a general statement that a crime victim was entitled  to
be treated “with dignity, respect, and sensitivity” and to
receive from the state  such “other compensation as the state may
6    This criterion should be prudently applied, as neither the
Fourth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment due process clause, nor the
Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment clause contain
express provision permitting a private right of action for
damages, but the United States Supreme Court has nonetheless
recognized that enjoyment and protection of these rights requires
a private right of action.   Bandoni recognizes that the failure
to expressly provide for a private right of action does not ipso
facto defeat an argument that a Constitutional provision is self-
7    But see, Justice Flanders argument that the victims’ right
amendment is self-executing and that these revisions were made
for the purpose of “economy of language.” Id., 715 A.2d at 624
(Fanders, J. dissenting).
8  The Trial Court’s decision was issued prior to this Court’s
decision in Bandoni, and therefore it did not have the benefit of
this Court’s guidelines for analyzing a claim to a private right
of action under the Constitution.  However, it is readily
discernible that the Trial Court focused on the issue of
harmonizing the right asserted with the scheme of rights
established in the constitution as a whole.
9  Cases following Hazel-Atlas recognize that bribery and
corruption of a judge constitute a fraud upon the court, which
may require that the underlying judgment be set aside. Johnson v.
Johnson, 424 P.2d 414 (Okl. 1967);  Chicago Title & Trust Co. v.
Fox Theatre Corp., 182 F. Supp. 18 (1960); United States v.
International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 349 F Supp 22, affd without op
410 US 919, 93 S Ct 1363, 35 L Ed 582 (1972); Root Refining Co.
v. Universal Oil Products Co., 169 F.2d 514, cert den 335 US 912,
69 S Ct 601, 93 L Ed 444;  Wilkin v. Sunbeam Corp., 466 F.2d 714
(1972) cert den 409 US 1126, 93 S Ct 940, 35 L Ed 2d 258;  .
10    Prior to initiating this lawsuit, Sherman did sue Attorney
Hutton and the insurance company that issued Hutton’s probate
bond to recover damages for Hutton’s embezzlement of estate
funds, and the Superior Court did provide a remedy for that
injury. Jane Munson, guardian of the person of Paul K. Sherman,  v. Thomas C. Hutton, No. 91-7880 (Providence County
Superior Court).  Not only did Attorney Hutton and Judge Almeida
corruptly apportion the jury award, Attorney Hutton then
embezzled over One Hundred Thousand Dollars of the money that did
go into Sherman’s probate estate.
11  In another Superior Court opinion on judicial immunity it 
was said that suing a judge in his indiv idual capacity for acts 
which allegedly infected a court case was superficially appealing, 
but was wrong and demonstrated a misunderstanding of the doctrine 
of judicial immunity: 
     Focusing on the conduct of [the] former justice ... in
     soliciting and receiving loans from lawyers - including
     attorneys involved directly and indirectly in a contested
     matter over which the judge presided - has great superficial
     appeal in the instant debate over judicial immunity.  It is
     hard to see how such conduct, when viewed in isolation,
     could be characterized as 'a function normally performed by
     a judge.'
     Yet the act of which plaintiff ... complains is not simply
     that of the former justice's solicitation and receipt of
     loans from attorneys involved directly or indirectly in a
     contested matter over which he presided.  Indeed, such
     activity, while highly improper, causes plaintiff ... no
     injury unless and until it infects the judicial proceeding
     to which he is a party.  Plaintiff ... seeks instead to hold
     defendant [justice] liable for his act of presiding over the
     ... divorce action at a time when he was secretly soliciting
     and receiving loans and favors from the lawyer counselling
     plaintiff's adversary and his law partner.
Hurley v. Fuyat, WL 930891 at 930896 (R.I.Super. 1994) (Savage,
12  Realistically, attorneys or litigants who have reason to
believe that a judge hearing their case is accepting bribes, are
far more likely to file a complaint with the Commission on
Judicial Tenure & Discipline than filing a complaint in Superior
Court seeking an injunction.  The Commission is a more
appropriate forum to review such allegations.
13  Regarding the victims’ indemnity fund bribery is not an
offense covered by the Act. R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-25-4.
14  Removal of a Supreme Court Justice requires impeachment which
is entrusted to the General Assembly on recommendation from the
Supreme Court. R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-16-7(b).
15    The other cornerstones of judicial independence are
separation of powers principles, life tenure for judges, and
public confidence in the court system.
16As America's legendary folklorist, Woody Guthrie, observed:
"Well, as through the world I've rambled, I've seen lots of funny
men. Some rob you with a sixgun, some with a fountain pen."
[lyric from "Pretty Boy Floyd"].  Woody Guthrie’s lyrics to
“Pretty Boy Floyd” can be found at
17  With this test of “actual adjudicated guilt of bribery”
enunciated as law there would be no reason to believe that
abrogating Almeida's judicial immunity will result in any judge
of the Supreme Court, the Superior Court, or any other court
becoming fearful of deciding cases.  Sensible judges will surely
understand that Almeida has been sued, not to vex and harass
Almeida, but because he took money that a jury awarded Sherman,
and because he violated the Rhode Island Constitution's
prohibition on selling justice.  Allowing a lawsuit against
Almeida in his official capacity under such circumstances will
not interfere with other judges’ liberty to exercise their
functions with independence and without fear of consequences.