LABEL. A narrow slip of paper or parchment, affixed to a deed or writing hanging at or out of the same. This name is also given to an appending seal.

LABOR. Continued operation; work.

2. The labor and skill of one man is frequently used in a partnership, and valued as equal to the capital of another.

3. When business has been done for another, and suit is brought to recover a just reward, there is generally contained in the declaration, a count for work and labor.

4. Where penitentiaries exist, persons who have committed crimes are condemned to be imprisoned therein at labor.

LACHES. This word, derived from the French lecher, is nearly synonymous with negligence.

2. In general, when a party has been guilty of laches in enforcing his right by great delay and lapse of time, this circumstance will at common law pre-judice, and sometimes operate in bar of a remedy which it is discretionary and not compulsory in the court to afford. In courts of equity, also delay will generally prejudice. 1 Chit. Pr. 786, and the cases there cited; 8 Com. Dig. 684; 6 Johns. Ch. R. 360.

3. But laches may be excused from, ignorance of the party's rights; 2 Mer. R. 362; 2 Ball & Beat. 104; from the obscurity of the transaction; 2 Sch. & Lef. 487; by the pendency of a suit; 1 Sch. & Lef. 413; and where the party labors under a legal disability, as insanity, coverture, infancy, and the like. And no laches can be imputed to the public. 4 Mass. Rep. 522; 3 Serg. & Rawle, 291; 4 Henn. & Munf. 57; 1 Penna. R. 476. Vide 1 Supp. to Ves. Jr. 436; 2 Id. 170; Dane's Ab. Index, h. t.; 4 Bouv. Inst. n. 3911.

LADY'S FRIEND. The name of a functioner in the British house of commons. When the husband sues for a divorce, or asks the passage of an act to divorce him from his wife, he is required to make a provision for her before the passage of the act; it is the duty of the lady's friend to see that such a provision is made. Macq. on H. & W. 213. LAGA. The law; Magna Carta; hence Saxon-lage, Mercen-lage, Dane-lage, &c.

LAGAN.Goods tied to a buoy and cast into the sea are so called. The same as Ligan. (q.v.)

LAIRESITE. The name of a fine imposed upon those who committed adultery or fornication. Tech. Dict. h. t.

LAITY. Those persons who do not make a part of the clergy. In the United States the division of the people into clergy and laity is not authorized by law, but is, merely conventional.

LAMB. A ram, sheep or ewe, under the age of one year. 4 Car. & P. 216; S. C. 19 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 351.

LAND. This term comprehends any found, soil or earth whatsoever, as meadows, pastures, woods, waters, marshes, furze and heath. It has an indefinite extent upwards as well as downwards; therefore land, legally includes all houses and other buildings standing or built on it; and whatever is in a direct line between the surface and the centre of the earth, such as mines of metals and fossils. 1 Inst. 4 a; Wood's Inst. 120; 2 B1. Com. 18; 1 Cruise on Real Prop. 58. In a more confined sense, the word land is said to denote "frank tenement at the least." Shepp. Touch. 92. In this sense, then, leaseholds cannot be said to be included under the word lands. 8 Madd. Rep. 635. The technical sense of the word land is farther explained by Sheppard, in his Touch. p. 88, thus: "if one be seised of some lands in fee, and possessed of other lands for years, all in one parish, and he grant all his lands in that parish (without naming them) in fee simple or for life; by this grant shall pass no, more but the lands he hath in fee simple." It is also said that land in its legal acceptation means arable land. 11 Co. 55 a. See also Cro. Car. 293; 2 P. Wms. 458, n.; 5 Ves. 476; 20 Vin. Ab. 203.

2. Land, as above observed, includes in general all the buildings erected upon it; 9 Day, R. 374; but to this general rule there are some exceptions. It is true, that if a stranger voluntarily erect buildings on another's land, they will belong to the owner of the land, and will become a part of it; 16 Mass. R. 449; yet cases are, not wanting where it has been decided that such an erection, under peculiar circumstances, would be considered as personal property. 4 Mass. R. 514; 8 Pick. R. 283, 402; 5 Pick, R. 487; 6 N. H. Rep. 555; 2 Fairf. R. 371; 1 Dana, R. 591; 1 Burr. 144.

LAND MARK. A monument set up in order to ascertain the boundaries between two contiguous estates. For removing a land mark an action lies. 1 Tho. Co. Litt. 787. Vide Monuments.

LAND TENANT. He who actually possesses the land. He is technically called the terre-tenant. (q. v.)

LANDLORD. He who rents or leases real estate to another.

2. He is bound to perform certain duties and is entitled to certain rights, which will here be briefly considered. 1st. His obligations are, 1. To perform all the express covenants into which he has entered in making the lease. 2. To secure to the tenant the quiet enjoyment of the premises leased; but a tenant for years has no remedy against his landlord, if he be ousted by one who has no title, in that case the law leaves him to his remedy against the wrong doer. Y. B. 22 H. VI. 52 b, and 32 H. VI. 32 b; Cro. Eliz. 214; 2 Leon. 104; and see Bac. Ab. Covenant, B. But the implied covenant for quiet enjoyment may be qualified, and enlarged or narrowed according to the particular agreement of the parties; and a general covenant for quiet enjoyment does not extend to wrongful evictions or disturbances by a stranger. Y. B. 26 H. VIII. 3 b. 3. The landlord is bound by his express covenant to repair the premises, but unless he bind himself by express covenant the tenant cannot compel him to repair. 1 Saund. 320; 1 Vent. 26, 44; 1 Sed. 429; 2 Keb. 505; 1 T. R. 812; 1 Sim. R. 146.

3. His rights are, 1. To receive the rent agreed upon, and to enforce all the express covenants into which the tenant may have entered. 2. To require the lessee to treat the premises demised in such manner that no injury be done to the inheritance, and prevent waste. 3. To have the possession of the premises after the expiration of the lease. Vide, generally, Com. L. & T., B. 3, c. 1; Woodf. L. & T. ch. 10; 2 Bl. Com. by Chitty, 275, note; Bouv. Inst. Index, h. t.; 1 Supp. to Ves. Jr. 212, 246, 249; 2 Id. 232, 403; Com. Dig. Estate by Grant, G 1; 5 Com. Dig. tit. Nisi Prius Dig. page 553; 8 Com. Dig. 694; Whart. Dig. Landlord & Tenant. As to frauds between landlord and tenant, see Hov. Pr. c. 6, p. 199 to 225.

LANGUAGE. The faculty which men possess of communicating their perceptions and ideas to one another by means of articulate sounds. This is the definition of spoken language; but ideas and perceptions may be communicated without sound by writing, and this is called written language. By conventional usage certain sounds have a definite meaning in one country or in certain countries, and this is called the language of such country or countries, as the Greek, the Latin, the French or the English language. The law, too, has a peculiar language. Vide Eunom. Dial. 2; Technical.

2. On the subjugation of England by William the Conqueror, the French Norman language was substituted in all law proceedings for the ancient Saxon. This, according to Blackstone, vol. iii. p. 317, was the language of the records, writs and pleadings, until the time of Edward III. Mr. Stephen thinks Blackstone has fallen into an error, and says the record was, from the earliest period to which that document can be traced, in the Latin language. Plead. Appx. note 14. By the statute 36 Ed. III. st. 1, c. 15, it was enacted that for the future all pleas should be pleaded, shown, defended, answered, debated and judged in the English tongue; but be entered and enrolled in Latin. The Norman or law French, however, being more familiar as applied to the law, than any other language, the lawyers continued to employ it in making their notes of the trial of cases, which they afterwards published, in that barbarous dialect, under the name of Reports. After the enactment of this statute, on the introduction of paper pleadings, they followed in the language, as well as in other respects, the style of the records, which were drawn up in Latin. This technical language continued in use till the time of Cromwell, when by a statute the records were directed to be in English; but this act was repealed at the restoration, by Charles II., the lawyers finding it difficult to express themselves as well and as concisely in the vernacular as in the Latin tongue; and the language of the law continued as before till about the year 1730, when the statute of 4 Geo. II. c. 26, was passed. It provided that both the pleadings and the records should thenceforward be framed in English. The ancient terms and expressions which had been so long known in French and Latin were now literally translated into English. The translation of such terms and phrases were found to be exceedingly ridiculous. Such terms as nisi prius, habeas corpus, fieri facias, mandamus, and the like, are not capable of an English dress with any degree of seriousness. They are equally absurd in the manner they are employed in Latin, but use and the fact that they are in a foreign language has made the absurdity less apparent.

3. By statute of 6 Geo. II., c. 14, passed two years after the last mentioned statute, the use of technical words was allowed to continue in the usual language, which defeated almost every beneficial purpose of the former statute. In changing from one language to another, many words and technical expressions were retained in the new, which belonged to the more ancient language, and not seldom they partook of both; this, to the unlearned student, has given an air of confusion, and disfigured the language of the law. It has rendered essential also the study of the Latin and French languages. This perhaps is not to be regretted, as they are the keys which open to the ardent student vast stores of knowledge. In the United States, the records, pleadings, and all law proceedings are in the English language, except certain technical terms which retain their ancient French and Latin dress.

4. Agreements, contracts, wills and other instruments, may be made in any language, and will be enforced. Bac. Ab. Wills, D 1. And a slander spoken in a foreign language, if understood by those present, or a libel published in such language, will be punished as if spoken or written in the English language. Bac. Ab. Slander, D 3; 1 Roll. Ab. 74; 6 T. R. 163. For the construction of language, see articles Construction; Interpretation; and Jacob's Intr. to the Com. Law Max. 46.

5. Among diplomatists, the French language is the one commonly used. At an early period the Latin was the diplomatic language in use in Europe. Towards the end of the fifteenth century that of Spain gained the ascendancy, in consequence of the great influence which that country then exercised in Europe. The French, since the age of Louis XIV. has become the almost universal diplomatic idiom of the civilized world, though some states use their national language in treaties and diplomatic correspondence. It is usual in these cases to annex to the papers transmitted, a translation in the language of the opposite party; wherever it is understood this comity will be reciprocated. This is the usage of the Germanic confederation, of Spain, and of the Italian courts. When nations using a common language, as the United States and Great Britain, treat with each other, such language is used in their diplomatic intercourse.

Vide, generally, 3 Bl. Com. 323; 1 Chit., Cr. Law, *415; 2 Rey, Institutions Judiciaires de l'Angleterre, 211, 212.

LANGUIDUS, practice. The name of a return made by the sheriff, when a defendant whom he has taken by virtue of process is so dangerously sick that to remove him would endanger his life or health. In that case the officer may and ought unquestionably to abstain from removing him, and may permit him to remain even in his own house, in the custody of a follower, though not named in the warrant, he keeping the key of the house in his possession the officer ought to remove him as soon is sufficiently recovered. If there be a doubt as to the state of health of the defendant, the officer should require the attendance and advice of some respectable medical man, and require him, at the peril of the consequences of misrepresentation, to certify in writing whether it be fit to remove the party, or take him to prison within the county. 3 Chit. Pr. 358. For a form of the return of languidus, see 3 Chit. P. 249; T. Chit. Forms, 53.

LAPSE, eccl. law. The transfer, by forfeiture, of a right or power to present or collate to a vacant benefice, from, a person vested with such right, to another, in consequence of some act of negligence of the former. Ayl. Parerg. 331.

LAPSED LEGACY. One which is extinguished. The extinguishment may take place for various reasons. See Legacy, Lapsed.

2. A distinction has been made between a lapsed devise of real estate and a lapsed legacy of personal estate. The real estate which is lapsed does not fall into the residue, unless so provided by the will, but descends to the heir at law; on the contrary, personal property passes by the residuary clause where it is not otherwise disposed of. 2 Bouv. Inst. 2154-6.

LARCENY, crim. law. The wrongful and fraudulent taking and carrying away, by one person, of the mere personal goods, of another, from any place, with a felonious intent to convert them to his, the taker's use, and make them his property, without the consent of the owner. 4 Wash. C. C. R. 700.

2. To constitute larceny, several ingredients are necessary. 1. The intent of the party must be felonious; he must intend to appropriate the property of another to his own use; if, therefore, the accused have taken the goods under a claim of right, however unfounded, he has not committed a larceny.

3. - 2. There must be a taking from the possession, actual or implied, of the owner; hence if a man should find goods, and appropriate them to his own use, he is not a thief on this account. Mart. and Yerg. 226; 14 John. 294; Breese, 227.

4. - 3. There must be a taking against the will of the owner, and this may be in some cases, where he appears to consent; for example, if a man suspects another of an intent to steal his property, and in order to try him leaves it in his way, and he takes it, he is guilty of larceny. The taking must be in the county where the criminal is to be tried. 9 C. & P. 29; S. C. 38 E. C. L. R. 23; Ry. & Mod. 349. But when the taking has been in the county or state, and the thief is caught with the stolen property in another county than that where the theft was committed, he may be tried in the county where arrested with the goods, as by construction of law, there is a fresh taking in every county in which the thief carries the stolen property.

5. - 4. There must be an actual carrying away, but the slightest removal, if the goods are completely in the power of the thief, is sufficient to snatch a diamond from a lady's ear, which is instantly dropped among the curls of her hair, is a sufficient asportation or carrying away.

6. - 5. The property taken must be personal property; a man cannot commit larceny of real estate, or of what is so considered in law. A familiar example will illustrate this; an apple, while hanging on the tree where it grew, is real estate, having never been separated from the freehold; it is not larceny, therefore, at common law, to pluck an apple from the tree, and appropriate it to one's own use, but a mere trespass; if that same apple, however, had been separated from the tree by the owner or otherwise, even by accident, as if shaken by the wind, and while lying on the ground it should be taken with a felonious intent, the taker would commit a larceny, because then it was personal property. In some states there are statutory provisions to punish the felonious taking of emblements or fruits of plants, while the same are hanging by the roots, and there the felony is complete, although the thing stolen is not, at common law, strictly personal property. Animals ferae naturae, while in the enjoyment of their natural liberty, are not the subjects of larceny; as, doves; 9 Pick. 15; Bee. 3 Binn. 546. See Bee; 5 N. H. Rep. 203. At common law, choses in action are not subjects of larceny. 1 Port. 33.

7. Larceny is divided in some states, into grand and petit larceny this depends upon the value of the property stolen. Vide 1 Hawk, 141 to 250, ch. 19; 4 Bl. Com. 229 to 250; Com. Dig. Justices, O 4, 5, 6, 7, 8; 2 East's P. C. 524 to 791; Burn's Justice, Larceny; Williams' Justice, Felony; 3 Chitty's Cr. Law, 917 to 992; and articles Carrying Away; Invito Domino; Robbery; Taking; Breach, 6.

LARGE. Broad; extensive; unconfined. The opposite of strict, narrow, or confined. At large, at liberty.

LAS PARTIDAS. The name of a code of Spanish law; sometimes called las siete partidas, or the seven parts, from the number of its principal divisions. It is a compilation from the civil law, the customary law of Spain, and the canon law. Such of its provisions is are applicable are in force in Louisiana, Florida, and Texas.

LASCIVIOUS CARRIAGE, law of Connecticut. An offence, ill defined, created by statute, which enacts that every person who shall be guilty of lascivious carriage and behaviour, and shall be thereof duly convicted, shall be punished by fine, not exceeding ten dollars, or by imprisonment in a common gaol, not exceeding two months, or by fine and imprisonment, or both, at the discretion of the court. This law was passed at a very early period. Though indefinite in its terms, it has received a construction so limiting it, that it may be said to punish those wanton acts between persons of different sexes, who are not married to each other, that flow from the exercise of lustful passions, and which are not otherwise punished as crimes against chastity and public decency. 2 Swift's Dig. 343; 2 Swift's Syst. 331.

2. Lascivious carriage may consist not only in mutual acts of wanton and indecent familiarity between persons of different sexes, but in wanton and indecent actions against the will, and without the consent of one of them, as if a man should forcibly attempt to pull up the clothes of a woman. 5 Day, 81.

LAST RESORT. A court of last resort, is one which decides, definitely, without appeal or writ of error, or any other examination whatever, a suit or action, or some other matter, which has been submitted to its judgment, and over which it has jurisdiction.

2. The supreme court is a court of last resort in all matters which legally come before it; and whenever a court possesses the power to decide without appeal or other examination whatever, a subject matter submitted to it, it is a court of last resort; but this is not to be understood as preventing an examination into its jurisdiction, or excess of authority, for then the judgment of a superior does not try and decide so much whether the point decided has been so done according to law, as to try the authority of the inferior court.

LAST SICKNESS. That of which a person died.

2. The expenses of this sickness are generally entitled to a preference, in payment of debts of an insolvent estate. Civ. Code of Lo. art. 3166; Purd. Ab. 393.

3. To prevent impositions, the statute of frauds requires that nuncupative wills shall be made during the testator's last sickness. Rob. on Frauds, 556; 20 John. R. 502.

LATENT, construction. That which is concealed; or which does not appear; for example, if a testator bequeaths to his cousin Peter his white horse; and at the time of making his will and at his death he had two cousins named Peter, and he owned two white horses, the ambiguity in this case would be latent, both as respects the legatee, and the thing bequeathed. Vide Bac. Max. Reg. 23, and article Ambiguity. A latent ambiguity can only be made to appear by parol evidence, and may be explained by the same kind of proof. 5 Co. 69.

LATITAT, Eng. law. He lies hid. The name of a writ calling a defendant to answer to a personal action in the king's bench; it derives its name from a supposition that the defendant lurks and lies hid, and cannot be found in the county of Middlesex, (in which the said court is holden,) to be taken there, but is gone into some other county, and therefore requiring the sheriff to apprehend him in such other county. Fitz. N. B. 78.

LAUNCHES. Small vessels employed to carry the cargo of a large one to and from the shore; lighters. (q. v.)

2. The goods on board of a launch are at the risk of the insurers till landed. 5 N. S. 887. The duties and rights of the master of a launch are the same as those of the master of a lighter.

LAW. In its most general and comprehensive sense, law signifies a rule of action; and this term is applied indiscriminately to all kinds of action; whether animate or inanimate, rational or irrational. 1 Bl. Com. 38. In its more confined sense, law denotes the rule, not of actions in general, but of human action or conduct. In the civil code of Louisiana, art. 1, it is defined to be "a solemn expression of the legislative will." Vide Toull. Dr. Civ. Fr. tit. prel. s. 1, n. 4; 1 Bouv. Inst. n. 1-3.

2. Law is generally divided into four principle classes, namely; Natural law, the law of nations, public law, and private or civil law. When considered in relation to its origin, it is statute law or common law. When examined as to its different systems it is divided into civil law, common law, canon law. When applied to objects, it is civil, criminal, or penal. It is also divided into natural law and positive law. Into written law, lex scripta; and unwritten law, lex non scripta. Into law merchant, martial law, municipal law, and foreign law. When considered as to their duration, laws are immutable and arbitrary or positive; when as their effect, they are prospective and retrospective. These will be separately considered.

LAW, ARBITRARY. An arbitrary law is one made by the legislator simply because he wills it, and is not founded in the nature of things; such law, for example, as the tariff law, which may be high or low. This term is used in opposition to immutable.

LAW, CANON. The canon law is a body of Roman ecclesiastical law, relative to such matters as that church either has or pretends to have the proper jurisdiction over:

2. This is compiled from the opinions of the ancient Latin fathers, the decrees of general councils, and the decretal epistles and bulls of the holy see. All which lay in the same confusion and disorder as the Roman civil law, till about the year 1151, when one Gratian, an Italian monk, animated by the discovery of Justinian's Pandects, reduced the ecclesiastical constitutions also into some method, in three books, which he entitled Concordia discordantium canonum, but which are generally known by the name of Decretum Gratiani. These reached as low as the time of Pope Alexander III. The subsequent papal decrees to the pontificate of Gregory IX., were published in much the same method, under the auspices of that pope, about the year 1230, in five books, entiled Decretalia Gregorii noni. A sixth book was added by Boniface VIII., about the year 1298, which is called Sextus decretalium. The Clementine constitution or decrees of Clement V., were in like manner authenticated in 1317, by his successor, John XXII., who also published twenty constitutions of his own, called the Extravagantes Joannis, all of which in some manner answer to the novels of the civil law. To these have since been added some decrees of the later popes, in five books called Extravagantes communes. And all these together, Gratian's Decrees, Gregory's Decretals, the Sixth Decretals, the Clementine Constitutions, and the Extravagants of John and his successors, form the Corpus juris canonici, or body of the Roman canon law. 1 Bl. Com. 82; EncyclopÇdie, Droit Canonique, Droit Public Ecclesiastique; Dict. de Jurispr. Droit Canonique; Ersk. Pr. L. Scotl. B. 1, t. 1, s. 10. See, in general, Ayl. Par. Jur. Can. Ang.; Shelf. on M. & D. 19; Preface to Burn's Eccl. Law, by Thyrwhitt, 22; Hale's Hist. C. L. 26-29; Bell's Case of a Putative Marriage, 203; Dict. du Droit Canonique; Stair's Inst. b. 1, t. 1, 7.

LAW, CIVIL. The term civil law is generally applied by way of eminence to the civil or municipal law of the Roman empire, without distinction as to the time when the principles of such law were established or modified. In another sense, the civil law is that collection of laws comprised in the institutes, the code, and the digest of the emperor Justinian, and the novel constitutions of himself and some of his successors. Ersk. Pr. L. Scotl. B. 1, t. l, s. 9; 6 L. R. 494.

2. The Institutes contain the elements or first principles of the Roman law, in four books. The Digests or Pandects are in fifty books, and contain the opinions and writings of eminent lawyers digested in a systematical method, whose works comprised more than two thousand volumes, The new code, or collection of imperial constitutions, in twelve books; which was a substitute for the code of Theodosius. The novels or new constitutions, posterior in time to the other books, and amounting to a supplement to the code, containing new decrees of successive emperors as new questions happened to arise. These form the body of the Roman law, or corpus juris civilis, as published about the time of Justinian.

3. Although successful in the west, these laws were not, even in the lifetime of the emperor universally received; and after the Lombard invasion they became so totally neglected, that both the Code and Pandects were lost till the twelfth century, A. D. 1130; when it is said the Pandects were accidentally discovered at Amalphi, and the Code at Ravenna. But, as if fortune would make an atonement for her former severity, they have since been the study of the wisest men, and revered as law, by the politest nations.

4. By the term civil law is also understood the particular law of each people, opposed to natural law, or the law of nations, which are common to all. Just. Inst. l. 1, t. 1, §1, 2; Ersk. Pr. L. Scot. B. 1, t. 1, s. 4. In this sense it, is used by Judge Swift. See below.

5. Civil law is also sometimes understood as that which has emanated from the secular power opposed to the ecclesiastical or military.

6. Sometimes by the term civil law is meant those laws which relate to civil matters only; and in this sense it is opposed to criminal law, or to those laws which concern criminal matters. Vide Civil.

7. Judge Swift, in his System of the Laws of Connecticut, prefers the term civil law, to that of municipal law. He considers the term municipal to be too limited in its signification. He defines civil law to be a rule of human action, adopted by mankind in a state of society, or prescribed by the supreme power of the government, requiring a course of conduct not repugnant to morality or religion, productive of the greatest political happiness, and prohibiting actions contrary thereto, and which is enforced by the sanctions of pains and penalties. 1 Sw. Syst. 37. See Ayl. Pand. B. 1, t. 2, p. 6.

See, in general, as to civil law, Cooper's Justinian the Pandects; 1 Bl. Com. 80, 81; EncyclopÇdie, art. Droit Civil, Droit Romain; Domat, Les Loix Civiles; Ferriere's Dict.; Brown's Civ. Law; Halifax's Analys. Civ. Law; Wood's Civ. Law; Ayliffe's Pandects; Heinec. Elem. Jur.; Erskine's Institutes; Pothier; Eunomus, Dial. 1; Corpus Juris Civilis; Taylor's Elem. Civ. Law.

LAW, COMMON. The common law is that which derives its force and authority from the universal consent and immemorial practice of the people. It has never received the sanction of the legislature, by an express act, wbich is the criterion by which it is distinguished from the statute law. It has never been reduced to writing; by this expression, however, it is not meant that all those laws are at present merely oral, or communicated from former ages to the present solely by word of mouth, but that the evidence of our common law is contained in our books of Reports, and depends on the general practice and judicial adjudications of our courts.

2. The common law is derived from two sources, the common law of England, and the practice and decision of our own courts. In some states the English common law has been adopted by statute. There is no general rule to ascertain what part of the English common law is valid and binding. To run the line of distinction, is a subject of embarrassment to courts, and the want of it a great perplexity to the student. Kirb. Rep. Pref. It may, however, be observed generally, that it is binding where it has not been superseded by the constitution of the United States, or of the several states, or by their legislative enactments, or varied by custom, and where it is founded in reason and consonant to the genius and manners of the people.

3. The phrase "common law" occurs in the seventh article of the amendments of the constitution of the United States. "In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall not exceed twenty dollar says that article, "the right of trial by jury shall be preserved. The "common law" here mentioned is the common law of England, and not of any particular state. 1 Gallis. 20; 1 Bald. 558; 3 Wheat. 223; 3 Pet. R. 446; 1 Bald. R. 554. The term is used in contradistinction to equity, admiralty, and maritime law. 3 Pet. 446; 1 Bald. 554.

4. The common law of England is not in all respects to be taken as that of the United States, or of the several states; its general principles are adopted only so far as they are applicable to our situation. 2 Pet, 144; 8 Pet. 659; 9 Cranch, 333; 9 S. & R. 330; 1 Blackf 66, 82, 206; Kirby, 117; 5 Har. & John. 356; 2 Aik. 187; Charlt. 172; 1 Ham. 243. See 5 Cow. 628; 5 Pet. 241; 1 Dall. 67; 1 Mass. 61; 9 Pick. 532; 3 Greenl. 162; 6 Greenl. 55; 3 Gill & John. 62; Sampson's Discourse before the Historical Society of New York; 1 Gallis. R. 489; 3 Conn. R. 114; 2 Dall. 2, 297, 384; 7 Cranch, R. 32; 1 Wheat. R. 415; 3 Wheat. 223; 1 Blackf. R. 205; 8 Pet. R. 658; 5 Cowen, R. 628; 2 Stew. R. 362.

LAW, CRIMINAL. By criminal law is understood that system of laws which provides for the mode of trial of persons charged with criminal offences, defines crimes, and provides for their punishments.

LAW, FOREIGN. By foreign laws are understood the laws of a foreign country. The states of the American Union are for some purposes foreign to each other, and the laws of each are foreign in the others. See Foreign laws.

LAW, INTERNATIONAL. The law of nature applied to the affairs of nations, commonly called the law of nations, jus gentium; is also called by some modern authors international law. Toullier, Droit Francais, tit. rel. §12. Mann. Comm. 1; Bentham. on Morals, &c., 260, 262; Wheat. on Int. Law; Foelix, Du Droit Intern. PrivÇ, n. 1.

LAW, MARTIALMartial law is a code established for the government of the army and navy of the United States.

2. Its principal rules are to be found in the articles of war. (q. v.) The object of this code, or body of regulations is to, maintain that order and discipline, the fundamental principles of which are a due obedience of the several ranks to their proper officers, a subordination of each rank to their superiors, and the subjection of the whole to certain rules of discipline, essential to their acting with the union and energy of an organized body. The violations of this law are to be tried by a court martial. (q. v.)

3. A military commander has not the power, by declaring a district to be under martial law, to subject all the citizens to that code, and to suspend the operation of the writ of habeas corpus. 3 Mart. (Lo.) 531. Vide Hale's Hist. C. L. 38; 1 Bl. Com. 413; Tytler on Military Law; Ho. on C. M.; M'Arth. on C. M.; Rules and Articles of War, art. 64, et seq; 2 Story, L. U. S. 1000.

LAW, MERCHANT. A system of customs acknowledged and taken notice of by all commercial nations; and those customs constitute a part of the general law of the land; and being a part of that law their existence cannot be proved by witnesses, but the judges are bound to take notice of them ex officio. See Beawes' Lex Mercatoria Rediviva; Caines' Lex Mercatoria Americana; Com. Dig. Merchant, D; Chit. Comm. Law; Pardess. Droit Commercial; Collection des Lois Maritimes antÇrieure au dix hutiäme siäcle, par Dupin; Capmany, Costumbres Maritimas; II Consolato del Mare; Us et Coutumes de la Mer; Piantandia, Della Giurisprudenze Maritina Commerciale, Antica e Moderna; Valin, Commentaire sur l'Ordonnance de la Marine, du Mois d'Aoñt, 1681; Boulay-Paty, Dr. Comm.; Boucher, Institutions au Droit Maritime.

LAW, MUNICIPAL. Municipal law is defined by Mr. Justice Blackstone to be "a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a state, commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong." This definition has been criticised, and has been perhaps, justly considered imperfect. The latter part has been thought superabundant to the first; see Mr. Christian's note; and the first too general and indefinite, and too limited in its signification to convey a just idea of the subject. See Law, civil. Mr. Chitty defines municipal law to be "a rule of civil conduct, prescribed by the supreme power in a state, commanding what shall be done or what shall not be done." 1 Bl. Com. 44, note 6, Chitty's edit.

2. Municipal law, among the Romans, was a law made to govern a particular city or province; this term is derived from the Latin municipium, which among them signified a city which was governed by its own laws, and which had its own magistrates.

LAW OF NATIONS. The science which teaches the rights subsisting between nations or states, and the obligations correspondent to those rights. Vattel's Law of Nat. Prelim. §3. Some complaints, perhaps not unfounded, have been made as to the want of exactness in the definition of this term. Mann. Comm. 1. The phrase "international law" has been proposed, in its stead. 1 Benth. on Morals and Legislation, 260, 262. It is a system of rules deducible by natural reason from the immutable principles of natural justice, and established by universal consent among the civilized inliabitants of the world; Inst. lib. 1, t. 2, §1; Dig. lib. 1, t. 1, l. 9; in order to decide all disputes, and to insure the observance of good faith and justice in that intercourse which must frequently occur between them and the individuals belonging to each or it depends upon mutual compacts, treaties, leagues and agreements between the separate, free, and independent communities.

2. International law is generally divided into two branches; 1. The natural law of nations, consisting of the rules of justice applicable to the conduct of states. 2. The positive law of nations, which consist of, 1. The voluntary law of nations, derived from the presumed consent of nations, arising out of their general usage. 2. The conventional law of nations, derived from the express consent of nations, as evidenced in treaties and other international compacts. 3. The customary law of nations, derived from the express consent of nations, as evidenced in treaties and other international compacts between themselves. Vattel, Law of Nat. Prel.

3. The various sources and evidence of the law of nations, are the following:

1. The rules of conduct, deducible by reason from the nature of society existing among independent states, which ought to be observed among nations. 2. The adjudication of international tribunals, such as prize courts and boards of arbitration. 3. Text writers of authority. 4. Ordinances or laws of particular states, prescribing rules for the conduct of their commissioned cruisers and prize tribunal's. 5. The history of the wars, negotiations, treaties of peace, and other matters relating to the public intercourse of nations. 6. Treaties of peace, alliance and commerce, declaring, modifying, or defining the pre-existing international law. Wheat. Intern. Law, pt. 1, c. 1, §14.

4. The law of nations has been divided by writers into necessary and voluntary; or into absolute and arbitrary; by others into primary and secondary, which latter has been divided into customary and conventional. Another division, which is the one more usually employed, is that of the natural and positive law of nation's. The natural law of nations consists of those rules, which, being universal, apply to all men and to all nations, and which may be deduced by the assistance of revelation or reason, as being of utility to nations, and inseparable from their existence. The positive law of nations consists of rules and obligations, which owe their origin, not to the divine or natural law, but to human compacts or agreements, either express or unplied; that is, they are dependent on custom or convention.

5. Among the Romans, there were two sorts of laws of nations, namely, the primitive, called primarium, and the other known by the name of secundarium. The primarium, that is to say, primitive or more ancient, is properly the only law of nations which human reason suggests to men; as the worship of God, the respect and submission which children have for their parents, the attachment which citizens have for their country, the good faith which ought to be the soul of every agreement, and the like. The law of nations called secundarium, are certain usages which have been established among men, from time to time, as they have been felt to be necessary. Ayl. Pand. B. 1, t. 2, p. 6.

As to the law of, nations generally, see Vattel's Law of Nations; Wheat. on Intern. Law; Marten's Law of Nations; Chitty's Law of Nations; Puffend. Law of Nature and of Nations, book 3; Burlamaqui's Natural Law, part 2, c. 6; Principles of Penal Law, ch. 13; Mann. Comm. on the Law of Nations; Leibnitz, Codex Juris Gentium Diplomaticus; Binkershoek, Quaestionis Juris Publici, a translation of the first book of which, made by Mr. Duponceau, is published in the third volume of Hall's Law Journal; Kuber, Droit des Gens Modeme de I'Europe; Dumont, Corps Diplomatique; Mably, Droit Public de l'Europe; Kent's Comm. Lecture 1.

LAW OF NATURE. The law of nature is that which God, the sovereign of the universe, has prescribed to all men, not by any formal promulgation, but by the internal dictate of reason alone. It is discovered by a just consideration of the agreeableness or disagreeableness of human actions to the nature of man; and it comprehends all the duties which we owe either to the Supreme Being, to ourselves, or to our neighbors; as reverence to God, self-defence, temperance, honor to our parents, benevolence to all, a strict adherence to our engagements, gratitude, and the like. Erskines Pr. of L. of Scot. B. 1, t. 1, s. 1. See Ayl. Pand. tit. 2, p. 5; Cicer. de Leg. lib. 1.

2. The primitive laws of nature may be reduced to six, namely: 1. Comparative sagacity, or reason. 2. Self-love. 3. The attraction of the sexes to each other. 4. The tendemess of parents towards their children. 5. The religious sentiment. 6. Sociability.

3. - 1. When man is properly organized, he is able to discover moral good from moral evil; and the study of man proves that man is not only an intelligent, but a free being, and he is therefore responsible for his actions. The judgment we form of our good actions, produces happiness; on the contrary the judgment we form of our bad actions produces unhappiness.

4. - 2. Every animated being is impelled by nature to his own preservation, to defend his life and body from injuries, to shun what may be hurtful, and to provide all things requisite to his existence. Hence the duty to watch over his own preservation. Suicide and duelling are therefore contrary to this law; and a man cannot mutilate himself, nor renounce his liberty.

5. - 3. The attraction of the sexes has been provided for the preservation of the human race, and this law condemns celibacy. The end of marriage proves that polygamy, (q. v.) and polyendry, (q. v.) are contrary to the law of nature. Hence it follows that the husband and wife have a mutual and exclusive right over each other.

6. - 4. Man from his birth is wholly unable to provide for the least of his necessities; but the love of his parents supplies for this weakness. This is one of the most powerful laws of nature. The principal duties it imposes on the parents, are to bestow on the child all the care its weakness requires, to provide for its necessary food and clothing, to instruct it, to provide for its wants, and to use coercive means for its good, when requisite.

7. - 5. The religious sentiment which leads us naturally towards the Supreme Being, is one of the attributes which belong to humanity alone; and its importance gives it the rank of the moral law of nature. From this sentiment arise all the sects and different forms of worship among men.

8. - 6. The need which man feels to live in society, is one of the primitive laws of nature, whence flow our duties and rights; and the existence of society depends upon the condition that the rights of all shall be respected. On this law are based the assistance, succors and good offices which men owe to each other, they being unable to provide each every thing for himself.

LAW, PENAL. One which inflicts a penalty for a violation of its enactment.

>

Transfer interrupted!

LAW, PRIVATE. An act of the legislature which relates to some private matters, which do not concern the public at large.

LAW, PROSPECTIVE. One which provides for, and regulates the future acts of men, and does not interfere in any way with what has past.

LAW, PUBLIC. A public law is one in which all persons have an interest.

LAW, RETROSPECTIVE. A retrospective law is one that is to take effect, in point of time, before it was passed.

2. Whenever a law of this kind impairs the obligation of contracts, it is void. 3 Dall. 391. But laws which only vary the remedies, divest no right, but merely cure a defect in proceedings otherwise fair, are valid. 10 Serg. & Rawle, 102, 3; 15 Serg. & Rawle, 72. See Ex post facto.

LAW, STATUTE. The written will of the legislature, solemnly expressed according to the forms prescribed by the constitution; an act of the legislature. See Statute.

LAW, UNWRITTEN, or lex non scripta. All the laws which do not come under the definition of written law; it is composed, principally, of the law of nature, the law of nations, the common law, and customs.

LAW, WRITTEN, or lex scripta. This consists of the constitution of the United States the constitutions of the several states the acts of the different legislatures, as the acts of congress, and of the legislatures of the several states, and of treaties. See Statute.

LAWFUL. That which is not forbidden by law. Id omne licitum est, quod non est legibus prohibitum, quamobrem, quod, lege permittente, fit, poenam non meretur. To be valid a contract must be lawful.

LAWLESS. Without law; without lawful control.

LAWS EX POST FACTO. Those which are made to punish actions committed before the existence of such laws, and which had not been declared crimes by preceding laws. Declar. of Rights, Mass. part 1, s. 24 Declar. of Rights, Maryl. art. 15. By the constitution of the United States and those of the several states, the legislatures are forbidden to pass ex post facto laws. Const. U. S. art. 1, s. 10, subd. 1.

2. There is a distinction between ex post facto laws and retrospective laws; every ex post facto law must necessarily be retrospective, but every retro-spective law is not an ex post facto law; the former only are prohibited.

3. Laws under the following circumstances are to be considered ex post facto laws, within the words and intents of the prohibition 1st. Every law that makes an act done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal, and punishes such action. 2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was when committed. 3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less, or different testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender. 3 Dall. 390.

4. The policy, the reason and humanity of the prohibition against passing ex post facto laws, do not extend to civil cases, to cases that merely affect the private property of citizens. Some of the most necessary acts of legislation are, on the contrary, founded upon the principles that private rights must yield to public exigencies. 3 Dall. 400; 8 Wheat. 89; see 1 Cranch, 109; 1 Gall. Rep. 105; 9 Cranch, 374; 2 Pet. S. C. R. 627; Id. 380; Id. 523.

LAWS OF THE TWELVE TABLES. Laws of ancient Rome composed in part from those of Solon, and other Greek legislators, and in part from the unwritten laws or customs of the Romans. These laws first appeared in the year of Rome 303, inscribed on ten plates of brass. The following year two others were added, and the entire code bore the name of the Laws of the Twelve Tables. The principles they contained became the source of all the Roman law, and serve to this day as the foundation of the jurisprudence of the greatest part of Europe.

See a fragment of the Law of the twelve Tables in Coop. Justinian, 656; Gibbon's Rome, c. 44.

LAWS OF THE HANSE TOWNS. A code of maritime laws known as the laws of the Hanse towns, or the ordinances of the Hanseatic towns, was first published in German, at Lubec, in 1597. In an assembly of deputies from the several towns held at Lubec, these laws were afterwards, May 23, 1614, revised and enlarged. The text of this digest, and a Latin translation, are published with a commentary by Kuricke; and a French translation has been given by Cleirac.

LAWS OF OLERON, maritime law. A code of sea laws of deserved celebrity. It was originally promulgated by Eleonor, duchess of Guienne, the mother of Richard the First of England. Returning from the Holy Land, and familiar with the maritime regulations of the Archipelago, she enacted these laws at Oleron in Guienne, and they derive their title from the place of their publication. The language in which they were originally written is the Gascon, and their first object appears to have been the commercial operations of that part of France only. Richard I., of England, who inherited the dukedom of Guienne from his mother, improved this code, and introduced it into England. Some additions were made to it by King John; it was prormulgated anew in the 50th year of Henry III., and received its ultimate confirmation in the 12th year of Edward III. Brown's Civ. and Adm. Law, vol. ii. p. 40.

2. These laws are inserted in the beginning of the book entitled "Us et Coutumes de la Mer," with a very excellent commentary on each section by Clairac, the learned editor. A translation is to be found in the Appendix to 1 Pet. Adm. Dec.; Marsh. Ins. B. 1, c. 1, p. 16. See Laws of Wisbuy: Laws of the Hanse Towns; Code

LAWS OF WISBUY, maritime law. A code of sea laws established by "the merchants and masters of the magnificent city of Wisbuy." This city was the ancient capital of Gothland, an island in the Baltic sea, anciently much celebrated for its commerce and wealth, now an obscure and inconsiderable place. Malyne, in his collection of sea laws, p. 44, says that the laws of Oleron were translated into Dutch by the people of Wisbuy for the use of the Dutch coast. By Dutch probably means German, and it cannot be denied that many of the provisions contained in the Laws of Wisbuy, are precisely the same as those which are found in the Laws of Oleron. The northern writers pretend however that they are more ancient than the Laws of Oleron, or than even the Consolato del Mare. Clairac treats this notion with contempt, and declares that at the time of the promulgation of the laws of Oleron, in 1266, which was many years after they were compiled, the magnificent city of Wisbuy had not yet acquired the denomination of a town. Be this as it may, these laws were for some ages, and indeed still remain, in great authority in the northern part of Europe. "Lex Rhodia navalis," says Grotius, "pro jure gentium, in illo mare Mediteraneo vigebat; sicut apud Gallium leges Oleronis, et apud omnes transrhenanos, leges Wisbuenses." Grotius de Jure bel. lib. 2, c. 3.

A translation of these laws is to be found in 1 Peter's Adm. Dee. Appendix. See Code; Laws of Oleron.

LAWS, RHODIAN, maritime. law. A code of laws adopted by the people of Rhodes, who had, by their commerce and naval victories, obtained the sovereignty of the sea, about nine hundred. years before the Christian era. There is reason to suppose this code has not been transmitted to posterity, at least not in a perfect state. A collection of marine constitutions, under the denomination of Rhodian Laws, may be seen in Vinnius, but they bear evident marks of a spurious origin. See Marsh. Ins. B. 1, c. 4, p. 15; this Dict. Code; Laws of Oleron; Laws of Wisbuy; Laws of the Hanse Towns.

LAWYER. A counsellor; one learned in the law. Vide dttorney.

LEGACY. A bequest or gift of goods or chattels by testament. 2 Bl. Com. 512; Bac. Abr. Legacies, A. See Merlin, RÇpertoire, mot Legs, s. 1; Swinb. 17; Domat, liv. 4, t. 2, §1, n. 1. This word, though properly applicable to bequests of personal estate only, has nevertheless been extended to property not technically within its import, in order to effectuate the intention of the testator, so as to include real property and annuities. 5 T. R. 716; 1 Burr. 268; 7 Ves. 522; Id. 391; 2 Cain. R. 345. Devise is the term more properly applied to gifts of real estate. Godolph. 271.

2. As the testator is presumed at the time of making his will to be inops concilii, his intention is to, be sought for, and any words which manifest the intention to give or create a legacy, are sufficient. Godolph. 281, pt. 3, c. 22, s. 21; Com. Dig. Chancery, 3 Y 4; Bac. Abr. Legacies, B 1.

3. Legacies are of different kinds; they may be considered as general, specific, and residuary. 1. A legacy is general, when it is so given as not to amount to a bequest of a specific part of a testator's personal estate; as of a sum of money generally, or out of the testator's personal estate, or the like. 1 Rop. Leg. 256; Lownd. Leg. 10. A general legacy is relative to the testator's death; it is a bequest of such a sum or such a thing at that time, or a direction to the executors, if such a thing be not in the testator's possession at that time, to procure it for the legatee. Cas. Temp. Talb. 227; Ambl. 57; 4 Ves. jr. 675; 7 Ves. jr. 399.

4. - 2. A specific legacy is a bequest of a particular thing, or money specified and distinguished from all other things of the same kind; as of a particular horse, a particular piece of plate, a particular term of years, and the like, which would vest immediately, with the assent of the executor. 1 Rop. Leg. 149; Lownd. Leg. 10, 11; 1 Atk. 415. A specific legacy has relation to the time of making the will; it is a bequest of some particular thing in the testator's possession at that time, if such a thing should be in the testator's possession at the time of his death. If it should not be in the testator's possession, the legatee has no claim. There are legacies of quantity in the nature of specific legacies, as of so much money with reference to a particular fund for their payment. Touchst. 433; Amb. 310; 4 Ves. 565; 3 Ves. & Bea. 5.

5. This kind of legacy is so far general, and differs so much in effect from a specific one, that if the funds be called in or fail, the legatees will not be deprived of their legacies, but be permitted to receive them out of the general assets; yet the legacies are go far specific, that they will not be liable to abate with general legacies upon a deficiency of assets. 2 Ves. jr. 640; 5 Ves. jr. 206; 1 Meriv. 178.

6. - 3. A residuary legacy is a bequest of all the testator's personal estate, not otherwise effectually disposed of by his will. Lownd. Leg, 10; Bac. Abr. Legacies, I.

7. As to the interest given, legacies may be considered, as absolute, for life, or in remainder. 1. A legacy is absolute, when it is given without condition, and is to vest immediately. See 2 Vern. 181; Ambl. 750; 19 Ves. 86; Lownd. 151; 2 Vern. 430; 1 Vern. 254; 5 Ves. 461; Com. Dig. Appendix, Chancery IX.

8. - 2. A legacy for life is sometimes given, with an executory limitation after the death of the tenant for life to another person; in this case, the tenant for life is entitled to the possession of the legacy, but when it is of specific article's, the first legatee must sign and deliver to the second, an inventory of the chattels expressing that they are in his custody for life only, and that afterwards they are to be delivered and remain to the use and benefit of the second legatee. 3 P. Wms. 336; 1 Atk. 471; 2 Atk. 82; 1 Bro. C. C. 279; 2 Vern. 249. See 1 Rop. Leg. 404, 5, 580. It seems that a bequest for life, if specific of things quo ipso usu consumuntur, is a gift of the property, and that there cannot be a limitation over, after a life interest in such articles. 3 Meriv. 194.

9. - 8. In personal property there cannot be a remainder in the strict sense of the word, and therefore every future bequest of personal property, whether it be preceded or not by any particular bequest, or limited on a certain or uncertain event, is an executory bequest, and falls under the rules by which that mode of limitation is regulated. Fearne, Cont. R. 401, n. An executory bequest cannot be prevented or destroyed by any alteration whatsoever, in the estate, out of which, or after, which it is limited. Id. 421; 8 Co. 96, a; 10 Co. 476. And this privilege of executory bequests, which exempts them from being barred or destroyed, is the foundation of an invariable rule, that the event on which an interest of this sort is permitted to take effect, is such as must happen within a life or lives in being, and twenty-one years, and the fraction of another year, allowing for the period of gestation afterwards. Fearne, Cont. R. 431.

10. As to the right acquired by the legatee, legacies may be considered as vested and contingent. 1. A vested legacy is one;, by which a certain interest, either present or future in possession, passes to the legatee. 2. A contingent legacy is one which is so given to a person, that it is uncertain whether any interest will ever vest in him.

11. A legacy may be lost by abatement, ademption, and lapse. I. Abatement, see Abatement of Legacies. 2. Ademption, see, Ademption. 3. When the legatee dies before the testator, or before the condition upon which the legacy is given be performed, or before the time at which it is directed to vest in interest have arrived, the legacy is lapsed or extinguished. See Bac. Abr. Legacies, E; Com. Dig. Chancery, 3 Y. 13; 1 P. Wms. 83; Lownd. Leg. ch. 12, p. 408 to 415; 1 Rop. Leg. ch. 8, p. 319 to 341.

12. In Pennsylvania, by legislative enactment, no legacy in favor of a child or other lineal descendant of any testator, shall be deemed or held to lapse or become void, by reason of the decease of such devisee or legatee, in the lifetime of the testator, if such devisee or legatee shall leave issue surviving the testator, but such devise or legacy shall be good and available, in favor of such surviving issue, with like effect, as if such devisee or legatee had survived the testator. The testator may however, intentionally exclude such survlving issue, or any of them. Act of March 19, 1810, 5 Smith's L. of Pa. 112.

13. As to the payment of legacies, it is proper to consider out of what fund they are to be paid; at what time; and to whom. 1. It is a general rule, that the personal estate is the primary fund for the payment of legacies. When the real estate is merely charged with those demands, the personal assets are to be applied in the first place towards their liquidation. 1 Serg. & Rawle, 453; 1 Rop. Leg. 463.

14. - 2. When legacies are given generally to persons under no disability to receive them, the payments ought to be made at the end of a year next after the testator's decease. 5 Binn. 475. The executor is not obliged to pay them sooner although the testator may have directed them to be discharged within six months after his death, because the law allows the executor one year from the demise of the testator, to ascertain and settle his testator's affairs; and it presumes that at the expiration of that period, and not before, all debts due by the estate have been satisfied, and the executor to be then able, properly to apply the residue among the legatees according to their several rights and interests.

15. When a legacy is given generally, and is subject to a limitation over upon a subsequent event, the divesting contingency will not prevent the legatee from receiving his legacy at the end of the year after the testator's death, and he is under no obligation to give security for re-payment of the money, in case the event shall happen. The principle seems to be, that as the testator has entrusted him without requiring security, no person has authority to require it. 1 Ves. Jr. 97; 18 Ves. 131; Lownd. on Legacies, 403.

16. As to the persons to whom payment to be made, see, where the legacy is given to an infant 1 Rop. Leg. 589 ;1 P. Wms. 285; 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 300; 3 Bro. C. C. 97, edit. by Belt; 2 Atk. 80; 2 Johns. C. R. 614; where the legacy is given to a married woman; 1 Rop. Leg. 595; Lownd. Leg 399; where the legacy is given to a lunatic, 1 Rop. Leg. 599; where it is given to a bankrupt; Id. 600; 2 Burr. 717.; where it is given to a person abroad, who has not been heard of for a long time. Id. 601 Finch, R. 419; 3 Bro. C. C. 510; 5 Ves. 458; Lownd. Leg. 398. See, generally, as to legacies; Roper on Legacies; Lowndes on Legacies; Bac. Abr. Legacy; Com. Dig. Administration, C 3, 5; Id. Chancery, 3 A; 3 G; 8 Y 1; Id. Prohibition, G 17; Vin. Abr. Devise; Id. Executor; Swinb. 17 to 44; 2 Salk. 414 to 416.

17. By the Civil Code of Louisiana, legacies are divided into universal legacies, legacies under an universal title, and particular legacies. 1. An universal legacy is a testamentary disposition, by which the testator gives to one or several persons the whole of the property which he leaves; at his decease. Civ. Code of Lo. art. 1599.

18. - 2. The legacy under an universal title, is that by which a testator bequeaths a certain proportion of the effects of which the law permits him to dispose, as a half, a third, or all his immovables, or all his movables, or a fixed proportion of all his immovables, or of all his movables. Id. 1604.

19. - 3. Every legacy not included in the definition given of universal legacies, and legacies under a universal title, is a legacy under a particular title. Id. 1618. Copied from Code Civ. art. 1003 and 1010. See Toullier, Droit Civil Francais, tome 5, p. 482, et seq.

LEGACY, ACCUMULATIVE. An accumulative legacy is a second bequest given by the same testator to the same legatee, whether it be of the same kind of thing, as money, or whether it be of different things, as, one hundred dollars, in one legacy, and a thousand dollars in another, or whether the sums are equal or whether the legacies are of a different naturer 2 Rop. Leg. 19.

LEGACY, ADDITIONAL. An additional legacy is one which is given by a codicil, besides one before given by the will; or it is an increase by a codicil of a legacy before given by the will. An additional legacy is generally subject to the same qualities and conditions as the original legacy. 6. Mod. 31; 2 Ves. jr. 449; 3 Mer. 154; Ward on Leg. 142.

LEGACY, ALTERNATIVE. One where the testator gives one of two things to the legatee without designating which of them; as, one of my two horses. Vide Election.

LEGACY, CONDITIONAL. A bequest which is to take effect upon the happening or, not happening of a certain event. Lownd. Leg. 166; Rop. Leg. Index, tit. Condition.

LEGACY, DEMONSTRATIVE. A demonstrative legacy is a bequest of a certain sum of money; intended for the legatee at all events, with a fund particularly referred to for its payment; so that if the estate be not the testator's property at his death, the legacy will not fail: but be payable out of general assets. 1 Rop. Leg. 153; Lownd. Leg 85; Swinb. 485; Ward on Leg. 370.

LEGACY, INDEFINITE. A bequest of things which are not enumerated or ascertained as to numbers or quantities; as, a bequest by a testator of all his goods, all his stocks in the funds. Lownd. on Leg. 84; Swinb. 485; Amb. 641; 1 P. Wms. 697.

LEGACY, LAPSED. A legacy is said to be lapsed or extinguished, when the legatee dies before the testator, or before the condition upon which the legacy is given has been performed, or before the time at which it is directed to vest in interest has arrived. Bac. Ab. Legacy, E; Com. Dig. Chancery, 3 Y 13; 1 P. Wms. 83. Lownd. Leg. 408 to 415; 1 Rop. Leg. 319 to 341. See, as to the law of Pennsylvania in favor of lineal descendants, 5 Smith's Laws of Pa. 112. Vide, generally, 8 Com. Dig. 502-3; 5 Toull. n. 671.

LEGACY, M0DAL. A modal legacy is a bequest accompanied with directions as to the mode in which it should be applied for the legatee's benefit; for example, a legacy to Titius to put him an apprentice. 2 Vern. 431; Lownd. Leg. 151.

LEGACY, PECUNIARY, A pecuniary legacy is one of money; pecuniary legacies are most usually general legacies, but there may be a specific pecuniary legacy; for example, of the money in a certain bag. 1 Rop. Leg. 150, n.

LEGACY, RESIDUARY. That which is of the remainder of an estate after the payment of all the debts and other legacies. Madd. Ch. P. 284.

LEGAL. That which is according to law. It is used in opposition to equitable, as the legal estate is, in the trustee, the equitable estate in the cestui que trust. Vide Powell on Mortg. Index, h. t.

2. The party who has the legal title, has alone the right to seek a remedy for a wrong to his estate, in a court of law, though he may have no beneficial interest in it. The equitable owner, is he who has not the legal estate, but is entitled to the beneficial interest.

3. The person who holds the legal estate for the benefit of another, is called a trustee; he who has the beneficiary interest and does not hold the legal title, is called the beneficiary, or more technically, the cestui que trust.

4. When the trustee has a claim, he must enforce his right in a court of equity, for he cannot sue any one at law, in his own name; 1 East, 497; 8 T. R. 332; 1 Saund. 158, n. 1; 2 Bing. 20; still less can he in such court sue his own trustee. 1 East, 497.

LEGAL ESTATE. One, the right to which may be enforced in a court of law. It is distinguished from an equitable estate, the rights to which can be established only in a court of equity. 2 Bouv. Inst. n. 1688.

LEGALIZATION. The act of making lawful.

2. By legalization, is also understood the act by which a judge or competent officer authenticates a record, or other matter, in order that the same may be lawfully read in evidence. Vide Authentication.

LEGATES. Legates are extraordinary ambassadors sent by the pope to catholic countries to represent him, and to exercise his jurisdiction. They are distinguished from the ambassadors of the pope who are sent to other powers.

2. The canonists divide them into three kinds, namely: 1. Legates A latere. 2. Legati missi. 3. Legati nati.

3. - 1. Legates latere hold the first rank among those who are honored by a legation; they are always chosen from the college of cardinals, and are called a latere, in imitation of the magistrates of ancient Rome, who were taken from the court, or side of the emperor.

4. - 2. The legati missi are simple envoys.

5. - 3. The legati nati, are those who are entitled to be legates by birth.

LEGATEE. A legatee is a person to whom a legacy is given by a last will and testament.

2. It is proposed to consider, 1. Who may be a legatee. 2. Under what description legatees may take.

3. - 1. Who may be a legatee. In general, every person may be a legatee. 2 Bl. Com. 512. But a person civilly dead cannot take a legacy.

II. Under what description legatees may take.

4. - §1. Of legacies to legitimate children. 1. When it appears from express declaration, or a clear inference arising upon the face of the will, that a testator in giving a legacy to a class of individuals generally, intended to apply the terms used by him to such persons only as answered the description at the date of the instrument, those individuals alone will be entitled, although if no such intention had been expressed, or appeared in the will, every person failing within that class at the testator's death, would have been included in the terms of the bequest. 1 Meriv. 320; and see 3 Ves. 611; Id. 609; 15 Ves. 363; Ambl. 397; 2 Cox, 291; 4 Bro. C. C. 55; 3 Bro. C. C. 148; 2 Cox, 384.

5. - 2. Where a legacy is given to a class of individuals, as to children, in general terms, and no period is appointed for the distribution of it, the legacy is due at the death of the testator; the payment of it being merely postponed to the end of a year after that event, for the convenience of the executor or administrator in administering the assets. The rights of the legatees are finally settled, and determined at the testator's decease. 1 Ball & B. 459; 2 Murph. 178. Upon this principal, is founded the well established rule that children in existence at that period, or legally considered so to be, are alone entitled to participate in the bequest. 1 Bro. C. C. 532, n.; 2 Bro. C. C. 658; 2 Cox, 190.; 1 Dick. 344; 14 Ves. 576; 1 Ves. jr. 405; 1 Cox, 68; 3 Bro. C. C. 391; Amb. 448; 1 Ves. sen. 485; 5 Binn. 607.

6. - 3. A child in ventre sa mere takes a share in a fund bequeathed to children, under the general description of "children," or of "children living at the testator's death." 1 Ves. sen. 85; and see 1 P. Wms. 244, 341; 2 Bro. C. C. 63; 1 Salk. 229; 2 Cox, 425; 5 Serg. & Rawle, 38. See tit. In ventre sa mere.

7. - 4. When legacies are given to a class of individuals, generally, payable at a future period, as to the children of B, when the youngest shall attain the age of twenty-one, or to be divided among them upon the death of C; any child who can entitle itself under the description, at the time when the fund is to be divided, may claim a share, viz: as well children living at the period of distribution, although not born till after the testator's death, as those born before, and living at the happening of that event. 1 Supp. to Ves. jr. 115, note 3, to Hill v. Chapman; 2 Supp. to Ves. jr. 157, note 1, to Lincoln v. Pelham. This general rule may be divided into two branches. First, when the division of the fund is postponed until a child or children attain a particular age; as, when a legacy is given to the children of A, at the age of twenty-one; in that case, so soon as the eldest arrives at that period, the fund is distributable among so many as are in existence at that time; and no child born afterwards can be admitted to a share, because the period of division fixes the number of legatees. Distribution is then made, and nothing remains for future partition. 1 Ball & Beat. 459; 3 Bro. C. C. 402; 5 Binn. 607; 2 Ves. jr. 690; 3 Ves. 730; 3 Bro. C. C. 352, ed. by Belt; 14 Ves. 256; 6 Ves. 345; 10 Ves. 152; 11 Ves. 238. Second, when the distribution of the fund is deferred during the life of a person in esse. In these cases, when the enjoyment of the thing given, is by the testator's express declaration not to be immediate by those, among whom it is to be finally divided, but is postponed to a particular period, as the death of A, then the children or individuals who answer the general description at that time, when distribution is to be made, are entitled to take, in exclusion of those afterwards coming in esse. 1 Ves. sen. 111; 1 Bro. C. C. 386; Id. 530; Id. 582; Id. 537; 1 Atk. 509; 2 Atk. 329; 5 Ves. 136; 3 Bro. C. C. 417; 1 Cox, 327; 8 Ves. 375; 15 Ves. 122; 1 Madd. R. 290; 1 Ball & Beat. 449.

8. - 5. The word "children " does not, ordinarily and properly speaking, comprehend grandchildren or issue generally; these are included in that term only in two cases, namely, 1. From necessity, which occurs where the will would remain inoperative unless the sense of the word "children" were extended beyond its natural import; and, 2. Where the testator has shown by other words, that he did not intend to use the term children in its proper and actual meaning, but in a more extended sense. 1 Supp. to Ves. jr. 202, note 2, to Bristow v. Ward. In the following cases, the word children was extended beyond its natural import from necessity. 6 Rep. 16; 10 Ves. 201; 2 Desauss. 123, in note. The following are instances where by using the words children and issue, indiscriminately, the testator showed his intention to use the former term in the sense of issue so as to entitle grandchildren, &c. to take. 1 Ves. sen. 196; S. C. Ambl. 555; 3 Ves. 258; 3 Ves. & Bea. 68; 4 Ves. 437; 2 Supp. to Ves. jr. 158. There is another class of cases wherein it was determined that grandchildren, &c. were not included in the word children. 2 Vern. 107; 4 Ves. 692; 10 Ves. 195; 3 Ves. & Bea. 59; see 2 Desauss. 308.

9. - §2. Of legacies to natural children. 1. Natural children unborn at the date of the will, cannot take under a bequest to the children generally, or to the illegitimate children of A B by Mary C; because a natural child cannot take as the issue of a particular person, until it has acquired the reputation of being the child of that person, which cannot be before its birth. Co, Litt. 3, b.

10. - 2. Natural children, unborn at the date of the will and described as children of the testator or another man, to be born of a particular woman, cannot take under such a description. 1 Peere, Wms. 529; 18 Ves. 288.

11. - 3. A legacy to an illegitimate child in ventre sa mere, described as the child of the testator or of another man, will fail, since whether the testator or such person were or were not in truth the father, is a fact which can only be ascertained by evidence that public policy forbids to be admitted. 1 Meriv. 141 to 152.

12. - 4. A child in ventre sa mere described merely as a child with which the mother is enceinte, without mentioning its putative father; or if the testator express a belief that the child is his own, and provide for it under that impression, regardless of the chance of being mistaken; then the child will in the first place be capable of taking and in the second, as presumed, be also, entitled in consequence of the testator's intent to provide for it, whether he be the father or not. 1 Meriv. 148, 152.

13. - 5. Natural children in existence, having acquired by reputation the name and character of children of a particular person, prior to the date of the will, are capable of taking under the name of children. 1 P. Wms. 529; 1 Ves. & Bea. 467. But the term child, son, issue, and every other word of that species, is to be considered as prima facie to mean legitimate child, son, or issue. Id.

14. - 6. Whether such children take or not depends upon the evidence of the testator's intention, manifested by the will, to include them in the term children; these cases are instances where the evidence of such intention was deemed insufficient. 5 Ves. 530; 1 Ves. & Bea. 454; 6 Ves. 43, 48; 1 Ves. & Bea. 4619; and see 1 Ves. & Bea. 456; 2 East, 530, 542. In the following, the evidence of intention was held to be sufficient. 1 Ves. & Bea. 469; Blundell v. Dunn, cited in 1 Madd. 433; Beachcroft v. Beachcroft, cited in 1 Madd. 430; 2 Meriv. 419.

15. - §3. Of legacies of personal estate to a man and his heirs. 1. A legacy to A and his heirs, is an absolute legacy to A, and the whole interest of the money vests in him for his use. 4 Mad. 361. But when no property in the bequest is given to A, and the money is bequeathed to his heirs, or to him with a limitation to his heirs, if he die before the testator, and the contingency happens, then if there be nothing in the will showing the sense in which the testator made use of the word heirs, the next of kin of A, are entitled to claim under the description, as the only persons appointed by law to succeed to personal estate. 5 Ves. 403; 4 Ves. 649; 1 Jac. & Walk. 388.

16. - 2. A bequest to the heirs of an individual, without addition or explanation, will belong to the next of kin; the rule, however, is subject to, alteration by the intention of the testator. If then the contents of the will show, that by the word heirs the testator meant other persons than the next of kin, those persons will be entitled. Ambl. 273; 1 P. Wms. 432; Forrest, 56; 2 Atk. 89; See, also, 1 Ves. jr. 145; 4 Madd. 361; 14 Ves. 488; 1 Car. Law R. 484.

17. - §4. Legacies to issue. 1. The term issue, is of very extensive import, and when used as a word of purchase, and unconfined by any indication of intention, will comprise all persons who can claim as descendants from or through the person to whose issue the bequest is made; and in order to restrain the legal sense of the term, a clear intention must appear upon the will. 3 Ves. 257; Id. 421; 1 Meriv. 434; 13 Ves. 344.

18. - 2. Where it appears clearly to be a testator's meaning to provide for a class of individuals living at the date of his will, and he provides against a lapse by the death of any of them in his lifetime, by the substitution of their issue; in such case, although the word will include all the descendants of the designated legatees, yet if any person who would have answered the description of an original legatee when the will was made, be then dead, leaving issue, that issue will be excluded, because the issue of those individuals only who were capable of taking original shares, at the date of the will, were intended to take by substitution; so that as the person who was dead when the will was made, could never have taken an original share, there is nothing for his issue to take in his place. 1 Meriv. 320.

19. - 3. When it can be collected from the will that a testator in using the word issue, did not intend it should be understood in its common acceptation, the import of it will be confined to the persons whom it was intended to comprehend. 7 Ires. 531; 3 Ves. 383; 7 Ves. 522; 1 Ves. jr. 143.

20. - §5. Of legacies to relations. 1. Under a bequest to relations, none are entitled but those, who in the case of intestacy, could have claimed under the statute of distribution. Forrest. 251; 4 Bro. C. C. 207; 1 Bro. C. C. 31; 3 Bro. C. C. 234; 5 Ves. 529; Ambl. 507; Dick. 380; 1 P. Wms. 327; 2 Ves. sen. 527; 19 Ves. 403; 1 Taunt. 263; 1 T. R. 435; n. See the following cases where the bequests were to "poor relations;" 1 P. Wms. 327; 8 Serg. & Rawle, 45; 1 Scho. & Lef. 111; "most necessitous relations;" Ambl. 636.

21. - 2. To this general rule there are several exceptions, namely, first, when the testator has delegated a power to an individual to distribute the fund among the testator's relations according to his discretion; in such an instance whether the bequest be made to "relations" generally, or to "poor," or "poorest," or "most necessitous" relations, the person may exercise his discretion in distributing the property among the testator's kindred although they be not within the statute of distributions. 1 Scho. & Lef. 111, and 16 Ves. 43; 1 T. R. 485, n.; Ambl. 708; 16 Ves. 27, 43. Secondly. Another exception occurs where a testator has fixed ascertain test, by which the number of relatives intended by him to participate in his property, can be ascertained; as if a legacy be given to such of the testator's relations as should not be worth a certain sum, in such case, it seems, all the testator's relatives answering the description would take, although not within the degrees of the statute of distributions. Ambl. 798. Thirdly. Another exception to the general rule is, where a testator has shown an intention in his will, to comprehend relations more remote than those entitled nuder the statute; in that case his intention will prevail. 1 Bro. C. C. 32, n., and see 1 Cox, 235 .

22. - 3. The word "relation" or "relations," may be so qualified as to exclude some of the next of kin from participating in the bequest; and this will also happen when the terms of the bequest are to my "nearest relations;" 19 Ves. 400; Coop. 275; 1 Bro. C. C. 293; and see 1 Ves. sen. 337; Ambl. 70; to testator's relations of his name 1 Ves. sen. 336; or stock, or blood; 15 Ves. 107.

23. - 4. The word relations being governed by the statute of distributions, no person can regularly answer the description but those who are of kin to the testator by blood, consequently relatives by marriage are not included in a bequest to relations generally. 1 Ves. sen. 84; 3 Atk. 761; 1 Bro. C. C. 71, 294.

24. - §6. Legacies to next of kin. 1. When a bequest is made to testator's next of kin, it is understood the testator means such as are related to him by blood. But it is not necessary that the next of kin should be of the whole blood, the half blood answering the description of next of kin, are equally entitled with the whole, and if nearer in degree, will exclude the whole blood. 1 Ventr. 425; Alleyn, 36; Styl. 74.

25 - 2. Relations by marriage are in general excluded from participating in a legacy given to the next of kin. 18 Ves. 53; 14 Ves. 376, 381, 386; and, see 3 Ves. 244; 18 Ves. 49. But this is only a prima facie construction, which may be repelled by the contrary intention of a testator. 14 Ves. 382.

26. - 3. A testator is to be understood to mean by the expression "next of kin," when he does not refer to the statute, or to a distribution of the property as if he had died intestate, those persons only who should be nearest of kin to him, to the exclusion of others who might happen to be within the degree limited by the statute. 3 Bro. C. C. 69; 19 Ves. 404; 14 Ves. 385. See 3 Bro. C. C. 64.

27. - 4. Nearest of kin will alone be entitled under a bequest to the next of kin in equal degree. 12 Ves. 433; 1 Madd. 36.

28. - §7. Legacies to legal personal representatives or to personal representatives. 1. Where there is nothing on the face of the will to manifest a different intention, the legal construction of the words "personal representatives," or "legal personal representatives," is executors or administrators of the person described. 6 Ves. 402; 6 Mead. 159. A legacy limited to the personal or legal personal representatives of A, unexplained by anything in the will, will entitle A's executors or administrators to it, not as representing A, or as part of his estate, or liable to his debts, but in their own right as personae designated by the law. 2 Mad. 155.

29. - 2. In the following cases the executors or administrators were held to be entitled under the designation of personal, or legal personal representatives. 3 Ves. 486; Anstr. 128.

30. - 3. The next of kin and not the executors or administrators, were, in the following cases, held to be entitled under the same designation. 3 Bro. C. C. 224, approved by Lord Rosslyn in 3 Ves. 486; 3 Ves. 146; 19 Ves. 404.

31. - 4. The same words were held to mean children, grandchildren, &c. to the exclusion of those persons who technically answer the description of "personal representatives." 3 Ves. 383.

32. - 5. A husband or wife may take as such, if there is a manifest intention in the will that they should and if either be clothed with the character of executor or administrator of the other, the prima facie legal title attaches to the office, which will prevail, unless an intention to the contrary be expressed or clearly apparent in the instrument. See 14 Ves. 382; 18 Ves. 49; 3 Ves. 231; 2 Ves. sen. 84; 3 Atk. 758; 1 Rop. Husb. and Wife, 326; 2 Rop. Husb. and. Wife, 64.

33. - §8. The construction of bequests when limited to executors and administrators. 1. Where personal estate is given to B, his executors and administrators, the law transfers to B the absolute interest in the legacy. 15 Ves. 537; 2 Mad. 155.

34. - 2. If no interest were given to B, and the bequest were to his executors and administrators, it should seem that the individual answering the description would be beneficially entitled as personal designatae, in analogy to the devise of real estate to the heir of B, without a previous limitation to B, whose heir would take by purchase in his own right, and not by force of the word "heir" considered as a term of limitation. 2 Mad. 155. See 8 Com. Dig. Devise of Personal Property, xxxvi.

35: - §9. Legacies to descendants. 1. A legacy to the descendants of A, will comprehend all his children, grandchildren, &c.; and if the will direct the bequest to be divided equally among them, they are entitled to the fund per capita. Ambl. 97; 3 Bro. C. C. 369.

36. - §10. Legacies to a family. 1. The word family, when applied to personal property, is synonymous with "kindred," or "relations;" see 9 Ves. 323. This being the ordinary acceptation of the word family, it may nevertheless be confined to particular relations by the context of the will; or the term may be enlarged by it, so that the expression may, in some cases, mean children, or next of kin, and in others may even include relations by marriage. See 8 Ves. 604; Dy. 333; 5 Ves. 166; Hob. 33; Coop. 122; 5 M. & S. 126; 17 Ves. 263; 1 Taunt. 266; 14 Ves. 488; 9 Ves. 319; 3 Meriv. 689.

37. - §11. Legacies to servants. 1. To entitle himself to a bequest "to servants," the relation of master and servant must have arisen out of a contract by which the claimant must have formed an engagement which entitled the master to the service of the individual during the whole period, or each and every part of the time for which he contracted to, serve. 12 Ves. 114; 2 Vern. 546.

38. - 2. To claim as a servant, the legatee must in general be in the actual service of the testator at the time of his death. Still a servant may be considered by a testator as continuing in his employment, and be intended to take under the bequest, although he quitted the testator's house previous to his death, so as to answer the description in the instrument; and to establish which fact declarations of the testator upon the subject cannot be rejected; but testimony that the testator meant a servant notwithstanding his having left the testator's service, to take a legacy bequeathed only to servants in his employment at his death, cannot be received as in direct opposition to the will. 16 Ves. 486, 489.

39. - §12. The different periods of time at which persons answering the descriptions of next of kin, family relations, issue, heirs, descendants and personal representatives, (to whom legacies are given by those terms generally, and without discrimination,) were required to be in esse, for the purpose of participating in the legatory fund. 1. When the will expresses or clearly shows that a testator in bequeathing to the relations, &c. of a deceased individual, referred to such of them as were in existence when the will was made, they only will be entitled; as if the bequest was, "I give ú1000 to the descendants of the late A B, now living," those descendants only in esse at the date of the will can claim the legacy. Ambl. 397.

40. - 2. But, in general, a will begins to speak at the death of the testator, and consequently in ordinary cases, relations, next of kin, issue, descendants, &c., living at that period will alone divide the property bequeathed to them by those words. See 1 Ball &. Beat. 459; 1 Bro. C. C. 532; 3 Bro. C. C. 224; 5 Ves. 399; 1 Jac. & Walk, 388, n.; 3 Meriv. 689; 5 Binn. 607; 2 Murph. 178.

41. - 3. If a testator express, or his intention otherwise appear from his will, that a bequest to his relations, &c., living at the death of a person, or upon the happening of any other event, should take the fund, his next of kin only in existence at the period described, will be entitled, in exclusion of the representatives of such of them as happened to be then dead. 3 Ves. 486; 9 Ves. 325; 1 Atk. 469; 15 Ves. 27; 4 Vin. Abr. 485, pl. 16; 8 Ves. 38; 5 Binn. 606; see 6 Munf. 47.

42. - §13. When the fund given to legatees, by the description of "family," "relations" "next in kin," &c., is to be divided among them either per capita, or per stirpes, or both per stirpes et capita. 1. Where the testator gives a legacy to his relations generally, if his next of kin be related to him in equal degree, as brothers, there being no children of a deceased brother, the brothers will divide the fund among them in equal shares, or per capita; each being entitled in his own right to an equal share. So it would be if all the brothers had died before the testator, one leaving two children, another three, &c., all the nephews and nieces would take in equal shares, per capita, in their own rights, and not as representing their parents; because they are sole next of kin, and related to the testator in equal degree. Pre. Ch. 54; and see 1 P. Wms. 595; 1 Atk. 454; 3 P. Wms. 50. But if the testator's next of kin happen not to be related to him in equal degrees, as a brother, and the children of a deceased brother, so as that under the statute the children would take per stirpes as representing their parent, namely, the share he would have taken had he been living; yet if the testator has shown au intention that his next of kin shall be entitled to his property in equal shares, i. e. per capita, the distribution by the statute will be superseded. This may happen where the bequest is to relations, next of kin, &c., to be equally divided among them; or by expressions of like import. Forrest. 251; and see 1 Bro. C. C. 33; 8 Serg. & Rawle, 43; 11 Serg. & Rawle 103; 1 Murph. 383.

43. - 2. Where a bequest is to relations, &c., those persons only who are next of kin are entitled, and the statute of distributions is adopted, not only to ascertain the persons who take, but also the proportions and manner in which the property is to be divided; the will being silent upon the subject, if the next of kin of the person described be not related to him in equal degree, those most remote can only claim per stirpes, or in right of those who would have been entitled under the statute if they had been living. Hence it appears that taking per stirpes, always supposes an inequality in relation-ship. For example, where a testator bequeaths a legacy to his "relations," or "next of kin," and leaves at his death two children, and three grandchildren, the children of a deceased child; the grandchildren would take their parents' share, that is, one-third per stirpes under the statute, as representing their deceased parent. 1 Cox, 235.

44. - 3. Where a testator bequeaths personal estate to several persons as tenants in common, with a declaration that upon all or any of their deaths before a particular time, their respective shares shall be equally divided among the issue or descendants of each of them, and they die before the arrival of the period, some leaving children, others grandchildren, and great grandchildren, and other grandchildren and more remote descendants in such case the issue of each deceased person will take their parents share per stirpes; and such issue, whether children only, or children and grandchildren, &c., will divide each parent's share among them equally per capita. 1 Ves. sen. 196.

45. - §14. The effect of a mistake in the names of legatees. 1. Where the name has been mistaken in a will or deed, it will be corrected from the instrument, if the intention appear in the description of the legatee or donee, or in other parts of the will or deed. For example, if a testator give a bequest to Thomas second son of his brother John, when in fact John had no son named Thomas, and his second son was called William; it was held William was entitled. 19 Ves. 381; Coop. 229; and see Ambl. 175; Co. Litt. 3, a; Finch's R. 403; 3 Leon, 18. When a bequest is made to a class of individuals, nomin-atim, and the name or christian name of one of them is omitted, and the name or christian name of another is repeated; if the context of the will sbow that the repetition of the name was error, and the name of the person omitted was intended to have been inserted, the mistake will be corrected. As where a testator gave his residuary estate to his six grandchildren, by their christian names. The name of Ann, one of them, was repeated, and the name of Elizabeth, another of them, was omitted. The context of the will clearly showed the mistake which had occurred, and Elizabeth was admitted to an equal share in the bequest. 1 Bro. C. C. 30; see 2 Cox, 186. And is to cases where parol evidence will be received to prove the mistakes in the names or additions of legatees, and to ascertain the proper person, see 3 B. & A. 632 to 642; 6 T. R. 676; 2 P. Wms. 137; 1 Atk. 410: 1 P. Wms. 421; 5 Rep. 68, b; 6 Ves. 42; 7 East, 302; Ambl. 75.

46. - §15. The effect of mistakes in the descriptions of legatees, and the admission of parol evidence in those cases. 1. Where the description of the legatee is erroneous, the error not having been occasioned by any fraud practiced upon the testator, and there is no doubt as to the person who was intended to be described, the mistake will not disappoint the bequest. Hence if a legacy be given to a person by a correct name, but a wrong description or addition, the mistaken description will not vitiate the bequest, but be rejected; for it is a maxim that veritas nominis tollit errorem demonstrationis. Ld. Bac. Max. reg. 25; and see 2 Ves. jr. 589; Ambl. 75; 4 Ves. 808; Plowd. 344; 19 Ves. 400.

47. - 2. Wherever a legacy is given to a person under a particular description and character which he himself has falsely assumed; or, where a testator, induced by the false representations of third persons to regard the legatee in a relationship which claims his bounty, bequeaths him a legacy according with such supposed relationship, and no motive for such bounty can be supposed, the law will not, in either case, permit the legatee to avail himself of the description, and therefore he cannot demand his legacy. See 4 Ves. 802; 4 Bro. C. C. 20.

48. - 3. The same principle which has establisbed the admissibility of parol evidence to correct errors in naming legatees, authorizes its allowance to rectify mistakes in the description of them. Ambl. 374; 1 Ves. jr. 266; 1 Meriv. 184.

49. - 4. If neither the will nor extrinsic evidence is sufficient to dispel the ambiguity arising from the attempt to apply the description of the legatee to the person intended by the testator, the legacy must fail from the uncer-tainty of its object. 7 Ves. 508; 6 T. R. 671.

50. - §16. The consequences of imperfect descriptions of, or reference to legatees, appearing upon the face of wills, and when parol evidence is admissible. These cases occur, 1. When a blank is left for the Christian name of the legatee. 2. When the whole name is omitted. 3. When the testator has merely written the initials of the name; and, 4. When legatees have been once accurately described, but in a subsequent reference to one of them, to take an additional bounty, the person intended is doubtful, from ambiguity in the terms.

51. - 1. When a blank is left for the Christian name of the legatee, evidence is admissible to supply the omission. 4 Ves. 680.

52. - 2. When the omission consists of the entire name of the legatee, parol evidence cannot be admitted to supply the blank. 2 Ch. Ca. 51.; 2 Atk. 239; 3 Bro. C.C. 311.

53. - 3. When a legatee is described by the initials of his name only, parol evidence may be given to prove his identity. 3 Ves. 148. When a patent ambiguity arises from an imperfect reference to one of two legatees correctly described in a prior part of the will, parol evidence is admitted to show which of them was intended, so that the additional legacy intended for the one will depend upon the removal of the obscurity by a sound interpretation of the whole will. 3 Atk. 257 and see 2 Ves. 217; 2 Eden, 107.

See further, upon this subject, Lownd on Leg. ch. 4; 1 Roper on Leg. ch. 2; Com. Dig. Chancery, 3 Y; Bac. Abr. h.. t. Vin. Abr. h. t.; Nels. Abr. h. t.; Whart. Dig. Wills, G. P.; Hamm. Dig. 756; GrimkÇ on Exec. ch. 5; Toll. on Executors, ch. 4.

LEGALIS HOMO. A person who stands rectus in curia, who possesses all his civil rights. A lawful man. One who stands rectus in curia, not outlawed nor infamous. In this sense are the words probi et legates homines.

LEGANTINE CONSTITUTIONS. The name of a code of ecclesiastical laws, enacted in national synods under Pope Gregory IX., and Pope Clement IV., about the years from 1220 to 1230.

LEGATARY. One to whom anything is bequeathed; a legatee. This word is sometimes though seldom used to designate a legate or nuncio.

LEGATION. An embassy; a mission.

2. All persons attached to a foreign legation, lawfully acknowledged by the government of this country, whether they are ambassadors, envoys, winisters, or attaches, are protected by the act of April 30, 1790, 1 Story's L. U. S. 83, from violence, arrest or molestation. 1 Dall. 117; 1 W. C. C. R. 232; 11 Wheat. 467; 2 W. C. C. Rep. 435; 4 W. C. C. R. 531; 1 Miles, 366; 1 N & M. 217; 1 Bald. 240; Wheat. Int. Law, 167. Vide Ambassador; Envoy; Minister.

LEGATORY, dead man's part or share. (q. v.) The third part of a freeman's personal estate, which by the custom of London, in case he had a wife and children, the freeman might always have disposed of by will. Bac. Ab. Customs of London, D 4.

LEGISLATIVE POWER. The authority under the constitution to make laws and to alter or repeal them.

LEGISLATOR. One who makes laws.

2. In order to make good laws, it is necessary to understand those which are in force; the legislator ought therefore, to be thoroughly imbued with a knowledge of the laws of his country, their advantages and defects; to legislate without this previous knowledge is to attempt to make a beautiful piece of machinery with one's eye shut. There is unfortunately too strong a propensity to multiply our laws and to change them. Laws must be yearly made, for the legislatures meet yearly but whether they are always for the better may be well questioned. A mutable legislation is always attended with evil. It renders the law uncertain, weakens its effects, hurts credit, lessens the value of property, and as they are made frequently, in consequence of some extraordinary case, laws sometimes operate very unequally. Vide 1 Kent, Com. 227 and Le Magazin Universel, tome ii. p. 227, for a good article against excessive legislation; Matter, De l'Influence des Lois sur les Moeurs, et de l'Influence des Moeurs sur les Lois.

LEGISLATURE, government. That body of men in the state which has the power of making laws.

2. By the Constitution of the United States, art. 1, s. 1, all legislative powers granted by it are vested in a congress of the United States, which shall consist of a senate and house of representatives.

3. It requires the consent of a majority of each branch of the legislature in order to enact a law, and then it must be approved by the president of the United States, or in case of his refusal, by two-thirds of each house. Const. U. S. art. 1, s. 7, 2.

4. Most of the constitutions of the several states, contain provisions nearly similar to this. In general, the legislature will not exercise judicial functions; yet the use of supreme power upon particular occasions, is not without example. Vide Judicial.

LEGITIMACY. The state of being born in wedlock; that is, in a lawful manner.

2. Marriage is considered by all civilized nations as the only source of legitimacy; the qualities of husband and wife must be possessed by the parents in order to make the offspring legitimate; and furthermore the marriage must be lawful, for if it is void ab initio, the children who may be the offspring of such marriage are not legitimate. 1 Phil. Ev. Index, h. t.; Civ. Code L. art. 203 to 216.

3. In Virginia, it is provided by statute of 1787, "that the issue of marriages deemed null in law, shall nevertheless be legitimate." 3 Hen. & Munf. 228, n.

4. A conclusive, presumption of legitimacy arises from marriage and cohabitation; and proof of the mother's irregularities will not destroy this presumption: pater est quem nuptiae demonstrant. To rebut this presumption, circumstances must be shown which render it impossible that the husband should be the father, as impotency and the like. 3 Bouv. Inst. n. 300-2. Vide Bastard; Bastardy; Paternity; Pregnancy.

LEGITIMATE. That which is according to law; as, legitimate children, are lawful children, born in wedlock, in contradistinction to bastards; legitimate autbority, or lawful power, in opposition to usurpation.

LEGITIMATION. The act of giving the character of legitimate cbildren to those who were not so born.

2. In Louisiana, the Civil Code, art. 217, enacts that "children born out of marriage, except those who are born of an incestuous or adulterous connexion, may be legitimated by the subsequent marriage of their father and mother whenever the latter have legally acknowledged them for their children, either before their marriage, or by the contract of marriage itself."

3. In most of the other states the character of legitimate children is given to those who are not so, by special acts of assembly. In Georgia, real estate may descend from a mother to her illegitimate children and their representatives, and from such child, for want of descendants, to brothers and sisters, born of the same mother, and their representatives. Prince's Dig. 202. In Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Vermont and Virginia, subsequent marriages of parents, and recognition by the father, legitimatize an illegitimate child and in Massachusetts, for all purposes except inheriting from their kindred. Mass. Rev. St. 414.

4. The subsequent marriage of parents legitimatizes the child in Illinois, but he must be afterwards acknowledged. The same rule seems to have been adopted in Indiana and Missouri. An acknowledgment of illegitimate children, of itself, legitimatizes in Ohio, and in Michigan and Mississippi marriage alone between the reputed parents has the same effcct. In Maine, a bastard inherits to one who is legally adjudged, or in writing owns himself to be the father. A bastard may be legitimated in North Carolina, on application of the putative father to court, either where he has married the mother, or she is dead, or married another or lives out of the state. In a number of the states, namely, in Alabama, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, and Virginia, a bastard takes by descent from his mother, with modifications regulated by the laws of these states. 2 Hill, Ab. s. 24 to 35, and the authori-ties there referred to. Vide Bastard; Bastardy; Descent.

LEGITIME, civil law. That portion of a parent's estate of which he cannot disinherit his children, without a legal cause. The civil code of Louisiana declares that donations inter vivos or mortis causa cannot exceed two-thirds of the property of the disposer if he leaves at his decease a legitimate child; one half if he leaves two children; and one-third if he leaves three or a greater number. Under the name of children are included descendants of wbatever degree they may be; it must be understood that they are only counted for the child they represent. Civil. Code of Lo. art. 1480.

3. Donation inter vivos or mortis causa, cannot exceed two-thirds of the property if the disposer having no children have a father, mother, or both. Id. art. 1481. Where there are no descendants, and in case of the previous decease of the father and mother, donations inter vivos and mortis causa, may, in general, be made of the whole amount of the property of the disposer. Id. art. 1483. The Code Civil makes nearly similar previsions. Code Civ. L. 3, t. 2, c. 3, s. 1, art. 913 to 919.

4. In Holland, Germany, and Spain, the principles of the Falcidian law, more or less limited, have been generally adopted. Coop. Just. 616.

5. In the United States, other than Louisiana and in England, there is no restriction on the right of bequeathing. But this power of bequeathing did not originally extend to all a man's personal estate; on the contrary, by the common law, as it stood in the reian of Henry II, a man's goods were to be divided into three equal parts, one of which went to his heirs or lineal descendants, another to his wife, and the third was at his own disposal; or if he died without a wife, he might then dispose of one moiety, and the other went to his children; and so e converso if he had no children, the wife was entitled to one moiety, and he might bequeath the other; but if he died without either wife or issue, the whole was at his own disposal. Glanv. 1. 2, c. 6;, Bract. 1. 2, c. 26. The shares of the wife and children were called their reasonable part. 2 Bl. Comm. 491-2. See Death's part; Falcidian law.

LENDER, contracts. He from whom a thing is borrowed.

2. The contract of loan confers rights, and imposes duties on the lender. 1. The lender has the right to revoke the loan at his mere pleasure; 9 Cowen, R. 687; 8 Johns. Rep. 432; 1 T. R. 480; 2 Campb. Rep. 464; and is deemed the owner or proprietor of the thing during the period of the loan; so that au action for a trespass or conversion will lie in favor of the lender against a stranger, who has obtained a wrongful possession, or has made a wrongful conversion of the thing loaned; as mere gratuitous permission to a third person to use a chattel does not, in contemplation of the common law, take it out of the possession of the owner. 11 Johns. Rep. 285; 7 Cowen, Rep. 753; 9 Cowen, Rep. 687; 2 Saund. Rep. 47 b; 8 Johns. Rep. 432; 13 Johns. Rep. 141, 661; Bac. Abr. Trespass, c 2; Id. Trover, C 2. And in this the Civil agrees with the common law. Dig. 13, 6, 6, 8; Pothier, PrÇt Ö, Usage, ch. 1, §1, art. 2, n. 4; art. 3, n. 9; Ayliffe's Pand. B. 4, t. 16, p. 517; Domat, B. 1, t. 5, §1, n. 4; and so does the Scotch law. Ersk. Pr. Laws of Scotl. B. 3, t. 1 §8.

3. - 2. In the civil law, the first obligation on the part of the lender, is to suffer the borrower to use and enjoy the thing loaned during the time of the loan, according to the original intention. Such is not the doctrine of the common law. 9 Cowen, Rep. 687. The lender is obliged by the civil law to reimburse the borrower the extraordinary expenses to which he has been put for the preservation of the thing lent. And in such a case, the borrower would have a lien on the thing, and may detain it, until these extraordinary expenses are paid, and the lender cannot, even by an abandonment of the thing to the borrower, excuse himself from re-payment, nor is he excused by the subsequent loss of the thing by accident, nor by a restitution of it by the borrower, without insisting upon repayment. Pothier, PrÇt Ö Usage, ch. 3, n. 82, 83; Dig. 13, 6, 18, 4; Ersk. Pr. Laws of Scotl. B. 3, t. 1, §9. What would be decided at common law does not seem very clear. Story on Bailm. §274. Another case of implied obligation on the part of the lender by the civil law is, that he is bound to give notice to the borrower of the defects of the thing loaned; and if he does not and conceals them, and any injury occurs to the borrower thereby, the lender is responsible. Dig. 13, 6, 98, 3; Poth. PrÇt Ö Usage, n. 84; Domat, Liv. 1, t. 5, s. 3, n. 3. In the civil law there is also an implied obligation on the part of the lender where the thing has been lost by the borrower, and after he has paid the lender the value of it, the thing has been restored to the lender; in such case the lender must return to the borrower either the price or thing. Dig. 13, 6, 17, 5; Poth. Id. n. 85. "The common law seems to recognize the same principles, though," says Judge Story, Bailm. §276, "it would not perhaps be easy to cite a case on a gratuitous loan directly on the point." See Borrower; Commodate; Story, Bailm. ch. 4; Domat. Liv. 2, tit. 5; 1 Bouv. Inst. n. 1078, et seq.

LESION, contracts. In the civil law this term is used to signify the injury suffered, in consequence of inequality of situation, by one who does not receive a full equivalent for what he gives in a commutative contract.

2. The remedy given for this injury, is founded on its being the effect of implied error or imposition; for in every commutative contract, equivalents are supposed to be given and received. Louis. Code, 1854. Persons of full age, however, are not allowed in point of law to object to their agreements as being injurious, unless the injury be excessive. Poth. Oblig. P. 1, c. 1, s. 1, art. 3, §4. But minors are admitted to restitution, not only against any excessive inequality, but against any inequality whatever. Poth. Oblig. P. 1, c. 1, s. 1, art. 3, §5; Louis. Code, art. 1858.

3. Courts of chancery relieve upon terms of redemption and set aside contracts entered into by expectant heirs dealing for their expectancies, on the ground of mere inadequacy of price. 1 Vern. 167; 2 Cox, 80; 2 Cas. in Ch. 136; 1 Vern. 141; 2 Vern. 121; 2 Freem. 111; 2 Vent. 359; 2 Vern. 14; 2 Rep. in Ch. 396; 1 P. W. 312; 1 Bro. C. C. 7; 3 P. Wms. 393, n.; 2 Atk. 133; 2 Ves. 125; 1 Atk. 301; 1 Wils. 286; 1 Wils. 320; 1 Bro. P. 6. ed. Toml. 198; 1 Bro. C. C. 1; 16 Ves. 512; Sugd. on Vend. 231, n. k.; 1 Ball & B. 330; Wightw. 25; 3 Ves. & Bea. 117; 2 Swanst. R. 147, n.; Fonb. notes to the Treatise of Equity, B, 1, c. 2, s. 9. A contract cannot stand where the party has availed himself of a confidential situation, in order to obtain some selfish advantage. Note to Crowe v. Ballard. 1 Ves. jun. 125; 1 Hov. Supp. 66, 7. Note to Wharton v. May. 5 Ves. 27; 1 Hov. Supp. 378. See Catching bargain; Fraud; Sale.

LESSEE. He to whom a lease is made. The subject will be considered by taking a view, 1. Of his rights. 2. Of his duties.

2. - 1. He has a right to enjoy the premises leased for the term mentioned in the lease, and to use them for the purpose agreed upon. He may, unless, restrained by the covenants in the lease, either assign it, or underlet the premises. 1 Cruise, Dig. 174. By an assignment of the lease is meant the transfer of all the tenant's interest in the estate to another person; on the contrary, an underletting is but a partial transfer of the property leased, the lessee retaining a reversion to himself.

3. - 2. The duties of the lessee are numerous. First, he is bound to fulfil all express covenants he has entered into in relation to the premises leased; and, secondly, he is required to fulfil all implied covenants, which the relation of lessee imposes upon him towards the lessor. For example, he is bound to put the premises to no other use than that for which it was hired; when a farm is let to him for common farming purposes, he cannot open a mine and dig ore which may happen to be in the ground; but if the mine has been opened, it is presumed both parties intended it should be used, unless the lessee were expressly restrained; 1 Cruise, Dig. 132. He is required to use the property in a tenant-like and proper manner; to take reasonable care of it and to restore it at the end of his term, subject only to the deterioration produced by ordinary wear and the reasonable use for which it was demised. 12 M. & W. 827. Although he is not bound, in the absence of an express covenant, to rebuild in case of destruction by fire or other accident, yet he must keep the house in a habitable state if he received it in good order. See Repairs. The lessee is required to restore the property to the lessor at the end of the term.

4. The lessee remains chargeable, after an assignment of his term, as before, unless the lessor has accepted the assignee; and even then he continues liable in covenant on an express covenaut, as for repairs, or to pay rent; 2 Keb. 640; but not for the performance of an implied one, or, as it is usually termed, a covenant in law. By the acceptance, he is discharged from debt for arrears of future rent. Cro. Jac. 309, 334; Ham. on Parties, 129, 130. Vide Estate for years; Lease;, Notice to quit: Tenant for years; Underlease.

LESSOR. contr. He who grants a lease. Civ. Code of L. art. 2647.

LESTAGE, Eng: law. Duties paid for unlading goods in port. Harg. L. Tr. 75.

LET. Hinderance, obstacle, obstruction; as, without let, molestation or hinderance.

TO LET. To hire, to lease; to grant the use and possession of something for a compensation.

2. This term is applied to real estate and the words to hire are more commonly used when speaking of personal estate. See Hire, Hirer, and Letter.

3. Letting is very similar to selling; the difference consists, in this; that instead of selling the thing itself, the letter sells only the use of it.

LETTER, com. law, Crim. law. An epistle; a despatch; a written message, usually on paper, which is folded up and sealed, sent by one person to another.

2. A letter is always presumed to be sealed, unless the presumption be rebutted. 1 Caines, R. 682. 1

3. This subject will be considered by 1st. Taking a view of the law relating to the transmission of letters through the post office; and, 2. The effect of letters in making contracts. 3. The ownership of letters sent and received.

4. - §1. Letters are, commonly sent through the post office, and the law has carefully provided for their conveyance through the country, and their delivery to the persons to whom they are addressed. The act to reduce into one the several acts establishing and regulating the post office department, section 21, 3 Story's Laws United States, 1991, enacts, that if any person employed in any of the departments of the post office establishment, shall unlawfully detain, delay, or open, any letter, packet, bag, or mail of letters, with which he shall be entrusted, or which shall have come to his possession, and which are intended to be conveyed by post or, if any such person shall secrete, embezzle, or destroy, any letter or packet entrusted to such person as aforesaid, and which shall not contain any security for, or assurance relating to money, as hereinafter described, every such offender, being thereof duly convicted, shall, for every such offence, be fined, not exceeding three hundred dollars, or imprisoned, not exceeding six months, or both, according to the circumstances and aggravations of the offence. And if any person, employed as aforesaid, shall secrete, embezzle, or destroy any letter, packet, bag, or mail of letters, with which he or she shall be entrusted, or which shall have come to his or her possession, and are intended to be conveyed by post, containing any bank nots, or bank post bill, bill of exchange, warrant of the treasury of the United States, note of assignment of stock in the funds, letters of attorney for receiving annuities or dividends, or for, selling stock in the funds, or for receiving the interest thereof, or any letter of credit, or note for, or relating to, payment of moneys or any bond, or warrant, draft, bill, or promissory note, covenant, contract, or agreement whatsoever, for, or relating to, the payment of money, or the delivery of any article of value, or the performance of any act, matter, or thing, or any receipt, release, acquittance, or discharge of, or from, any debt; covenant, or demand, or any part thereof, or any copy of any record of any judgment or decree, in any court of law or chancery, or any execution which way may have issued thereon; or any copy of any other record, or any other article of value, or any writing representing the same or if any such person, employed as aforesaid, shall steal, or take, any of the same out of any letter, packet, bag, or mail of letters, that shall come to his or her possession, such person shall, on conviction for any such offence, be imprisoned not less than ten years, nor exceeding twenty-one years; and if any person who shall have taken charge of the mails of the United States, shall quit or desert the same before such person delivers it into the post office kept at the termination of the route, or some known mail carrier, or agent of the general post office, authorized to receive the same, every such person, so offending, shall forfeit and pay a sum not exceeding five hundred dollars, for every such offence; and if any person concerned in carrying the mail of the United States, shall collect, receive, or carry any letter, or packet, or shall cause or procure the same to be done, contrary, to this act, every such offender shall forfeit and pay for every such offence a sum, not exceeding fifty dollars.

5. - §2. Most contracts may be formed by correspondence; and cases not unfrequently arise where it is difficult to say whether the concurrence of the will of the contracting parties took place or not. In order to form a contract both parties must concur at the same time, or there is no agreement. Suppose, for example, that Paul of Philadelphia, is desirous of purchasing a thousand bales of cotton, and offers by letter to Peter of New Orleans, to buy them from him at a certain price; but on the next day he changes his mind, and then he writes to Peter that he withdraws his offer; or on the next day he dies; in either case, there is no contract, because Paul did not continue in the same disposition to buy the cotton, at the time that his offer was accepted. The precise moment when the consent of both parties is perfect, is, in strictness, when the person who made the offer becomes acquainted with the fact that it has been accepted. But this may be presumed from circumstances. The acceptance must be of the same precise terms without any variance whatever. 4 Wheat. 225; see 1 Pick. 278; 10 Pick. 326; 6 Wend. 103.

6. - §3. A letter received by the person to whom it is directed, is the qualified property of such person: but where it is of a private nature, the receiver has no right to publish it without the consent of the writer, unless under very extraordinary circumstances; as, for example, when it is requisite to the defence of the character of the party who received it. 2 Ves. & B. 19; 2 Atk. 542; Amb. 737; 1 Ball. & B. 207; 1 Mart. (Lo.) R. 297; Denisart, verbo Lettres Missives. Vide Dead Letter; Jeopardy; Mail; Newspaper; Postage; Post Master General.

LETTER, contracts. In the civil law, locator, and in the French law, locateur, loueur, or bailleur, is he who, being the owner of a thing, lets it out to another for hire or compensation. See Hire; Locator; Conductor; Story on Bailm. §369.

2. According to the French and civil law, in virtue of the contract, the letter of a thing to hire impliedly engages that the hirer shall have the full use and enjoyment of the thing hired, and that he will fulfil his own engagements and trusts in respect to it, according to the original intention of the parties. This implies an obligation to deliver the thing to the hirer; to refrain from every obstruction to the use of it by the hirer during the period of the bailment; to do no act which shall deprive the hirer of the thing; to warrant the title and possession to the hirer, to enable him to use the thing or to perform the service; to keep the thing in suitable order and repair for the purpose of the bailment; and finally to warrant the thing from from any fault inconsistent with the use of it. These are the main obligations deduced from the nature of the contract, and they seem generally founded on unexceptionable reasoning. Pothier, Louage, n. 53; Id. n. 217; Domat, B. 1, tit. 4, §3 Code Civ. of L. tit. 9, c. 2, s. 2. It is difficult to say how far (reasonable as they are in a general sense) these obligations are recognized in the common law. In some respects the common law certainly differs. See Repairs; Dougl. 744, 748; 1 Saund. 321, 32e, and ibid. note 7; 4 T. R. 318; 1 Bouv. Inst. n. 980 et seq.

LETTER, civil law. The answer which the prince gave to questions of law which had been submitted to him by magistrates, was called letters or epistles. See Rescripts.

LETTER OF ADVICE. comm. law. A letter containing information of any circumstances unknown to the person to whom it is written; generally informing him of some act done by the writer of the letter.

2. It is usual and perfectly proper for the drawer of a bill of exchange to write a letter of advice to the drawee, as well to prevent fraud or alteration of the bill, as to let the drawee know what provision has been made for the payment of the bill. Chitt. Bills 185. (ed. of 1836.)

LETTER OF ATTORNEY, practice. A written instrument under seal, by which one or more persons, called the constituents, authorize one or more other persons called the attorneys, to do some lawful act by the latter, for or instead, and in the place of the former. 1 Moody, Cr. Cas. 52, 70.

2. The authority given in the lettor of attorney is either general, as to transact all the business of the constituent; or special, as to do some special business, particularly named; as, to collect a debt.

3. It is revocable or irrevocable; the former when no interest is conveyed to the attorney, or some other person. It is irrevocable when the constituent conveys a right to the attorney in the matter which is the subject of it; as, when it is given as part security. 2 Esp. R. 565. Civil Code of Lo: art. 2954 to 2970.

LETTER BOOK, commerce. A book containing the copies of letters written by a merchant or trader to his correspondents.

2. After notice to the plaintiff to produce a letter which he admitted to have received from the defendant, it was held that an entry by a deceased clerk, in a letter book professing to be a copy of a letter from the defendant to the plaintiff of the same date, was admissible evidence of the contents, proof having been given, that according to the course of business, letters of business written by the plaintiff were copied by this clerk and then sent off by the post. 3 Campb. R. 305. Vide 1 Stark Ev. 356; Bouv. Inst. n. 3139.

LETTER CARRIER. A person employed to carry letters from the post office to the persons to whom they are addressed.

2. The act of congress of March 3, 1851, Statutes at Large of U. S. by Minot, 591, directs, §10, That it shall be in the power of the postmaster general, at all post offices where the postmaster's are appointed by the president of the United States, to establish post routes within the cities or towns, to provide for conveying letters to the post office by establishing suitable and convenient places of deposit, and by employing carriers to receive and deposit them in the post office; and at all such offices it shall be in his power to cause letters to be delivered by suitable carriers, to be appointed by him for that purpose, for which not exceeding one or two cents shall be charged, to be paid by the person receiving or sending the same, and all sums so received shall be paid into the post office department: Provided, The amount of compensation allowed by the postmaster general to carriers shall in no case exceed the amount paid into the treasury by each town or city under the provisions of this section.

3. It is further enacted by c. xxi. s. 2, That the postmaster general shall be, and he is hereby, authorized to appoint letter carriers for the delivery of letters from any post office in California or Oregon, and to allow the letter carriers who may be appointed at any such post office to demand and receive such sum for all letters, newsapers, or other mailable matter delivered by them, as may be recommended by the postmaster for whose office such letter carrier may be appointed, not exceeding five cents for every letter, two cents for every newspaper, and two cents for every ounce of other mailable matter and the postmaster general shall be, and he is hereby, authorized to empower the special agents of the post office department in California and Oregon to appoint such letter carriers in their districts respectively, and to fix the rates of their compensation within the limits aforesaid, subject to, and until the final action of, the postmaster general thereon. And such appointments may be made, and rates of compensation modified from time to time, as may be deemed expedient and the rates of compensation may be fixed, and graduated in respect to the distance of the place of delivery from the post office for which such carriers are appointed, but the rate of compensation of any such letter carrier shall not be changed after his appointment, except by the orde